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ABSTRACT
THE WORLD IN-BETWEEN | cinematography
Nur Yavuz
M.F.A. In Graphical Arts 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Nezih Erdoğan 
November, 2000
And cinema. The importance of saying and... and...and.... Images 
neither starts nor ends, they occupy the in-between. Cinema and 
philosophy come together to show the power of the in-between. 
Images understood as such are neither psychoanalytic nor linguistic 
determinants. The immanent flow of images with its undetermined 
intervals is what enables us to contemplate on time and movement 
and memory and consciousness and percepts and affects... And 
philosophy.
Keywords: cinema and philosophy, time-image, movement-image, 
memory, interval, consciousness, perception.
Ö ZET
ARALIKTAKİ DÜNYA: sinem atografi
Nur Yavuz
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü 
Yüksek lisans
Tez Yöneticisi: Asist. Prof. Dr. Nezih Erdoğan
Ve sinema. Eşiği geçmeyi ya da doldurmayı değil, eşiğin kendisini 
sorunlaştıran ve...ve., ve’ler silsilesi. Sinema ve felsefe ancak bu eşik 
ile birbirine bağlanabilir. Bir başlangıç ve bir sonu değil her zaman 
aralığı kollayan, yolundan çıkmış zamanın bir ürperme gibi üzerimize 
serdiği bir düşüncedir bu. İmge, beraberinde getirdiği imallarla bu 
aralıktan çıktıkça, psikanaliz ve dil biliminin dize getirme eylemlerine 
karşı ele geçirilemeyen bir kavramlar dizisine açacaktır kendini. 
Hafıza, bilinç, algı, duygu, ve hareket artık ne felsefenin ne de 
sinemanin sahip olduğu kavramlardır. Zaman, içinde mi dışında mı 
olduğumuzu bir türlı kestiremediğimiz zaman, hiç kimsenin olmayan 
ayni zamanda hiç olan bir aradaki dünyada bu imge-kavramlara 
işaret etmektedir. Düşünemediğimiz ama kimi zaman hissettiğimiz bu 
yeryüzü deliklerine.
Anahtar sözcükler: sinema ve felsefe, imge-süre, imge-devinim, algi, 
bilinç.
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INTRODUCTION
Of the image too it is difficult to speak rigorously,
Maurice Blanchot
Cinema has been a challenging form of art, influencing and 
influenced by many theoretical approaches from the beginning of our 
century. Concerning a before and an after, it has always been 
discussed as a turning point, a break within the traditional 
representational arts. As a result, it is, at all times com pared to other art 
forms such as literature, painting, theater and for a greater extent to 
photography which has been seen as its predecessor, its germinating 
point.
Like photography, cinema has introduced a way of mediating 
reality through an apparatus, i.e. camera. Images, 
produced/reproduced by mechanical means had an objective status
 ^ p } n / \  ^
owing to the neutrality of the intervening medium. This objectivity had
a twofold result concerning the status of mechanically (re) produced
images in relation to natural perception: On the one hand, camera
was regarded as an extension to the natural perception, enriching our
field of perception with the various methods it otters, such as close-ups
which bring things to a close proximity. In this manner, it w idened our
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scope of the world since the capabilities of the medium was 
technically superior to the human eye. On the other hand, it was a 
threat to sustaining natural perception because it took the privilege of 
perception from the subject. The camera, thus, was a neutral ‘seer’ 
plunged into reality, more than our psychological and physiological 
capabilities allow.
However, the question concerning the reality effect in cinema
r- V.·,
has been interrupted by a shift in terms of the conceptualization of 
perception returning again to the mechanical abilities and limitations
' I ' ^ '
of the medium. Like in natural perception, the camera itself was a
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limitation, a framing. Even if the frame is not something concrete and 
has no materiality of its own, like our bio-logical frame that situates our 
perceptual field, both were dependent on a certain kind of selection, 
and a projection of this selection on a sensitive surface, which situates 
the grounds of what is visible and what is not, by tearing apart a 
certain moment from the flow of everyday life to build up a new thing 
with the captured instances of reality.
It was this stroboscopic effect' which provides the subject 
(cinematic and natural) with a position to see only through a hole. 
Through this hole - as if standing out of the cave - all one can see is a 
representation of the world, the projected reality, a torn apart instant, 
on the cave wall. The term illusion was to be found in the apparatus
itself, as was the objective recording of reality. The complexity of terms 
in approaching cinema, thus, happens at the first time the camera is 
turned on; the movie camera is objective and illusionary at the same 
time.2 Such two contradictory terms, immanent to the apparatus, 
created two camps in cinema, like that of Western philosophy. The 
cinematographic images were whether regarded as things in 
themselves independent of any mediation -in materialist approach-,
/ T  O ! '  ' ' ' '' C
or they were the mere reflections of an improper mediation (as it is in 
natural perception, sensation, consciousness) -in idealism-.
Realism in cinema has often been regarded as a terriporary 
movement, a standpoint of the filmmaker or the critic through a 
specific understanding of the medium, and interpreted in terms of 
certain waves, such as New Wave and Neo-Realism. However, 
contemporary theories mostly characterize cinema as a form of 
illusion. In other words, while the reality effect that the camera 
introduces has been regarded as an artistic form, a certain approach, 
illusionary nature of the apparatus has becom e the underlying 
argument of main discussions. This characterization bears a certain 
resemblance to Plato’s criticism of art in The Republic. Plato considers 
art as being essentially illusory. Rather than having the capacity to
' A stroboscope being an instrument in the form of a revolving disk with holes around the 
edge through which an object is viewed or a rapidly flashing light that illuminates an object 
intermittently.
■ The question of cinematographic apparatus does not only consist of the recording of the 
camera. It also involves directing and shooting the film; setting and actors; the montage 
phase and the viewing which happens in the movie theater. This complexity of 
cinematographic images is indeed more multifaceted.
master what we see, we are placed at the mercy of a viewpoint upon 
the world that is d icta ted to us by the artwork. We are outside the 
cave or we see through a hole. Furthermore Plato believes that art 
tends to indulge sensation at the expense of reason by undermining 
the self-control of the viewer. After all, art was the misapplications of 
thought to be banned from city. Illusionary as they were, 
cinematographic images were also producing a new form of 
representation, which had an apparent evocation in the twentieth 
century social milieu. The kind of deception that cinematic illusion 
endowed the film spectator with was a precise instantiation of the kind 
of deception wrought by the ideology upon the spectator. If we 
remember Jean Louis Baudry’s application of Plato's cave metaphor 
to cinema, we see that, cinematographic images are equated with 
the shadows in the cave: "vacuous, degraded, and insubstantial 
projections that, by a kind of ideological-optical illusion, are mistakenly 
but avoidably taken for reality...." (Shaviro: 38)
This kind of an understanding of the relationship of cinematic 
experience to reality, I think, is the main root where psychoanalytic 
and structuralist approaches originate from. Both structuralist and 
psychoanalytic film theory in this context introduce the dominance of 
the "notion of represenfation" in film fheory. If we consider 
psychoanalysis, and its ways of handling fhe spectator, it is important 
to map the psychological relations that have been drawn. The
illusionism, promoted and achieved now and then in the movie 
theater, has been a basic discussion since, in cinema; the projective 
aspect was one of the most apparent issues (projecting projection). 
Furthermore, as Wills and Brunette state;
...Since much of Laconian theory is based on the model of 
the mirror stage, the illusory fullness of the imaginary, and 
the problematizing of vision as the subject is introduced to 
castration and thus to the symbolic, Lacan’s emphasis on 
the visual has seemed particularly appropriate to the study 
of the film. (17)
So, in embracing Lacan’s account of the symbolic, cinema places 
brackets around Symbolic, and hence holds back from the affirmation 
of Lacan’s initial proposal. If we remember Lacan’s triad of Imaginary, 
Symbolic and The Real, the application of these stages to cinema 
theory has tended to forget The Real, at the first instant, because 
illusionary they were, Lacan’s Real would have never existed in this 
Symbolic order of images. If in Lacan’s conceptualization these stages 
are penetrating into one another, the application of these stages to 
cinema theory has regarded them as separate entities within 
boundaries and in chronological hierarchy. If we remember the 
application of mirror stage to cinema we see that the spectator 
follows the stages sequentially, at the end approaching to symbolic 
order. As transformed into terminological methodologies, this 
approach manifests itself only in terms of fhe Symbolic (in the 
exchange of phallus and in the forms of cdsfrafion anxiefy, or in
Oedipal triangle), thus the Imaginary, like the Real, also, could only be 
understood in the symbolic orders ot language.
If we remember Christian Metz's project, the "attempt to 
disengage the cinema-object from the imaginary and to win it for the 
symbolic" we see how these attempts merge with structural linguistics 
(Metz: 3). However as we could see the idea of representation does 
not only occur with the mechanical challenges of twentieth century 
introduced, considering what Jean-Luc Nancy directs our attention to: 
"...the West is precisely what designates itself as limit, as demarcation, 
even when it ceaselessly pushes back the frontiers of its imperium.” 
(Nancy: 1) Thus, the imaginary possibilities of the medium could only 
be understood within the limits of the symbolic. The separation of 
images from the flow of the matter, thus their subordination to the 
symbolic order can be traced back to the Hegelian roots of modern 
thinking. According to the Hegelian principle of "sense-certainty", 
singular, immediate experience is radically impossible. One cannot 
designate a "this", cannot identify a "here" and "now" without already 
having assumed the universal forms of Subjectivity, Time and Space. 
Experience is not possible without a concept. Therefore there cannot 
be a particular, singular experience without a predefined context. In 
this connection, as Shaviro asserts:
Indeed, my own stability as a subject is dependent upon 
my ability to recognize and order my impressions, to 
comprehend them in communicable things, and to refer
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them as to actual objects. I am able to reflect and act only 
in so far as I can both read my perceptions as non- 
immediate signs and identify them with things that are 
really there. 'Natural' perception is thus never raw or 
immediate; it is always already subordinated to a double 
articulation. (Shaviro: 47).
The notion of "double articulation" refers to the idea that there 
can be no perception or other experience without linguistic 
articulation. This idea dom inated the main approaches to film theory. 
This is clear in the attempts of Christian Metz to problematize the 
cinematic image in such a form of linguistic double articulation. In 
fact, what is intrinsic to such attitudes is the common assumption that 
human and cinematic experience, therefore is originally and 
fundamentally cognitive. Here, the problem of perception is 
understood and handled under the question of knowledge and it is 
equated with the reflective consciousness of perception.
Already Hegel grasps essential knowledge -which will 
engender absolute knowledge- as this movement of arising 
and negating any representation given by this rising, as well 
as any representation of this rising. Hegel names this" the 
experience of consciousness” . Thus the experience is 
traversal to the limits, traversal as knowledge, and no 
knowledge of the traversal if not formed by "traversing” 
itself. (Nancy: 2)
Thus the characteristic of representational thought is: to 
represent for itself, both itself and its outside, the outside of its limits.
This is the consciousness of outside that double articulation brings 
about. If traversing the limits is thought achieving itself is the main 
approach that defines a here, elsewhere a passage-to-unthought 
occurs throughout Gilles Deleuze’s work. A thought is always yet to 
come, about to arrive, a thought not of the outside but from the 
outside.
The key point on the position of unthought, will be discussed in 
the second chapter of my thesis. Introducing the in-between, this 
chapter also brings forward the main theme of my problem .
It is useful, then, briefly to mention in further detail the main 
approach of my thesis regarding the role of unthought in Deleuzian 
philosophy in contrast to psychoanalytic and linguistic understandings 
of the term. If the train entering the station is a strong metaphor for
I
cinema it is not for the reason that the train has already arrived at the i 
station rather in arriving the train points out to empty stations; they are I 
inhabited with no one, there is not a certain arrival time, nor there is 
localizable stations. Rather in waiting the non-arrival of thought-train 
we are faced with optical and sound situations-stations: all suggesting 
the relation of thought to cinema as a possibility opening :
If a philosopher says "I don ’t know” we are not faced with a
personal statement. Maybe, there is no more a place to be
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reached with words or explanations, or maybe beyond the 
limits philosophy can reach, he or she is faced with a ‘no 
mon’s land’ where the steps tremble, the words stutter, 
hopes are blinded, situations are undecidable, the known 
faces are fading. (Baker 22-23)
In this sense, the no man's land of the unthought becomes a 
series of forces, the land of percept and affects. The unthought for 
Deleuze always remains as a creative force. It cannot be considered 
as a dark place to be deciphered and understood. If things shatter in 
this land it is because nothing is clear yet. However, tor psychoanalysis, 
the unthought disguised in unconscious is dark therefore should be 
understood and brought to light in the symbolic orders of language. 
Psychoanalysis defines a lack and fhen fry to recover it. The same 
approach can be seen in attempts to recover time. Time shouldn’t be 
lost but kept. It should be kept as a dead past therefore while 
remembering it could be cognitive and regained. Unless the 
blackness -illusory fullness of the imaginary- is seen from a distance 
there is no train in this equation. The train should enter the station 
otherwise all stations would be meaningless, imaginary holes in the 
surface of the world. If we don ’t see the train in Deleuze’s situations it is 
only because the imaginary fullness of the train could not be 
understood as such.
My attempt to understand what Gilles Deleuze affirms in terms of 
cinema, would touch on issues that belong to the entire trajectory of
his writings, regarding cinema and philosophy. What Deleuze proposes 
in this sense, can be seen an opposite standpoint to determining 
conceptualizations of cinema, because he prefers fo reach 
indeferminacy through indeterminacy, rather than determining a fixed 
center: the experiencing-traversing subject. This is also true when he 
deals with cinematographic images. As David Rodowick states: “ the 
cinema produces images and signs as movement, that is, as 
movement-images. No static description can be adequate to the 
essential mobility of cinemafographic images“ (Rodowick: 39).
Thus, double articulafion is nof only a principle condition of 
linguisfic sysfems, but of all forms of what Deleuze and Guattari calls 
stratification in everyday life; fhe hierarchical ordering, coding and 
territorializing of previously multiple and heterogeneous forces. The 
alternative between presence and mediation, or phenomenological 
immediacy and linguistic deferral, is therefore a misleading one: in 
both instances experience is at once distanced and anchored in a 
living present. The essential thing, on the other hand, is the degrees of 
the fluidity among images, while structural linguistics totally denies 
such fluidity. In order to open new ways to approach images we have 
to supply a theoretical ground that would approach cinematographic 
experience in terms of "continuous, immanent variations" rather than 
trying to render it to linguistic forms.
10
For these reasons, in the beginning of the first chapter I will try to 
clarify the relation between language and cinema, as Deleuze 
problematizes in his cinema books. Rather than contributing to the 
notion of the double articulation in this discussion, Deleuze defines 
matter i.e. images as flow, following Bergson’s trajectory. Pointing out 
the most specific “ technical” aspect i.e. movement, we can trace this 
irreducible difference if we continue on the relation between cinema 
and photography.
The mechanical (re)production of realify wifh the film camera 
was not simply same as the one that photography introduces. 
Although the chemical process of tracing of light onto a light sensitive 
surface is a similar process in two media, unlike photography, cinema 
was adding another element "an abstract idea of time" in which the 
initial given “ instantaneous sections’’  ^of the photography is set to pass 
consecutively which at the end produces an illusion of movemenf. 
And this is what differentiated it from the photography, however still 
maintaining a version of it:
Cinema, in the beginning, was only considered, as being 
able to do what photography cannot do, it was nothing 
more than an innovation, which enables one to record
 ^Although I use 'instantaneous section” as the still image at this instant, it is clear that we 
never see a cinematographic image still enough.
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movement. For this reason, it was only considered as a
living photograph, (my trans. Pudovkin: 310)
In cinema the still photographs were being presented 
consequently, thus the spectator was taced with a movement effect. 
Matter is moving, nobody objects to this assertion. However in moving, 
images bring to light the question of how the movement is 
represented in cinema. As Pudovkin states, this was the major 
tendency of the first films; to capture movements of the world: "...the 
movement of a train, the movement of the crowds on a street, a view 
from the window pane of a moving train...” (my trans. Pudovkin: 310) 
That is why at the beginning of cinematic experience, we were shown 
a train approaching the station, and for a long time it has been a 
metaphor for cinema, as we have discussed. However, we cannot 
simply limit the relation of movement to cinema as an initial 
amazement of the innovation. It touches essentially on the relation of 
philosophy to cinema as Deleuze concentrates in the two volumes of 
his writings on cinema. The problem of reconstitution of movement in 
cinema calls us to see not only modernity's most mechanical images, 
but it also involves the disfiguring logic of the image in philosophy. In 
these two volumes his interests does not depend only on the fact that 
cinema depends on movement; rather it is because movement itself
,tUf.
challenges fhe conventional notions of percepfion. For Deleuze, a 
philosopher is not someone who produces notions: rather, he only 
becomes a philosopher, by creating new kinds of perceptions.
12
Perception will no longer reside in the relation between a 
subject and an object, but rather in the movement serving 
as the limit of that relation, in the period associated with 
the subject and object. Perception will confront its limit; it 
will be in the midst of the things, throughout its own 
proximity, as the presence of one haecceity in another, the 
prehension of one by fhe other or the passage from one to 
the other. Look only at the movements. (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987; 282)
At this point, it is necessary - particularly in understanding the 
terminology utilized in the first chapter of my thesis, about movement- 
image and also in anticipation of what Deleuze will bring about the 
new set of contradictions in time-image - to mention the notion of 
movement in cinema for elaborating on our problem. In the first 
chapter of Movement-Image, Deleuze talks about the reconstitution 
of movement, in terms of time and space referring to Bergson’s three 
theses on movement in Creative Evolution. The first thesis questions two 
givens of cinema; instantaneous sections (images-photograms) and 
an abstract idea of time which is in the apparatus and makes images 
to pass consecutively, therefore creating an illusion of movement, 
through an understanding of space as indivisible and time as divisible. 
Movements are passing through the space, but the time is a given, 
subordinated to space in this thesis.
Second thesis defines this misconception in two ways; that of the 
antiquity and modern science. Modern science, consists in relating
13
movement to any-instant-whatever, but not to privileged instants as in 
antiquity and dance, the instant of ideal postures. So that modern 
science can be defined as to take time as an independent variable. 
Cinema seems the last descendent of fhis lineage, which Bergson 
traced, where the camera emerges as the generalizing equivalent of 
translafing movemenf to any-instant-whatever. This is a function of 
equidisfant instants selected as to create in the illusion of movement, 
an impression of continuity. Muybridge’s sequential photography as 
always discussed as a generic gesture through cinema can be seen 
as an example. Reconstituting movement with immobile sections of it: 
by recording action in any-instant-whatever of the mechanical time 
and positions in space. The discussions concerning the illusion in 
cinema seems, in fact, to have stemmed from the stroboscopic effect 
which we have mentioned earlier: The projection in cinema is like a 
stroboscope presenting before our eyes immobile sections, passing in 
a certain speed and creating an illusion of movement.
According to Deleuze, however, on Bergson's third thesis, you 
cannot reconstitute movement with positions in space and instants in 
time: by immobile sections. If it is only possible if you add to these 
immobile sections the abstract idea of time, which is mechanical 
homogenous and identical for all movements it should be questioned. 
Because in this equation you would miss the movement in a way that 
even if you bring fwo instants and two positions together, the
14
movement would always occur in the interval between the two. So 
Bergson proposes a real movement which is beyond the discussions on 
cinematographic illusion, real movement occurring in duration, and 
relates the parts to a whole which changes, and thus expresses the 
changing of the whole in relation to the parts and is itself a mobile 
section of duration. This is the profound thesis, in Creative Evolution, 
according to Deleuze:
1) There are not only instantaneous images, that is 
immobile sections of movement; 2) There are movement- 
images which are mobile sections of duration; 3) There are 
finally, time-images, that is, duration-images, change- 
images, relation-images, volume-images, which are 
beyond movement itself. (Deleuze, 1989, 11)
At this point, I believe it is important to elaborate more on the
concept of duration, since it evolves as being an important term in
Bergson’s conceptualization. Duration is not a factor of human
activity, belonging to lived acts; at the same time it is not anonymous.
How Deleuze explains it, is in terms of slowness and fasfness, a
combinafion of these terms creating different rhythms. Duration
cannot be understood as having one rhythm, i.e mechanical time. In
fact, one is tempted to conceive of durafion by measuring it by the
one that is lived by consciousness, and making it a function of a
homogenous Time. However, such tendencies would always fail to
grasp the real duration, which is a compound of relaxations and
tensions. Such conceptualizations on movement and time constitute
15
the main framework in which the arguments of this thesis will take 
place.
The relation between photography and cinema does not only 
occur in representing the objects of a world, therefore separating 
them, but also in our relation to time. Unlike the discussions on how 
photography and cinema has brought about a fundamental shift in 
the relation between the original and the copy, the world and its 
representation, eliminating from the work of art its temporal aspect, I 
will try to clarify images in time and thus in their relation to memory. This 
is not as one relates to images as mnemonic souvenirs of the past as 
generally understood, and as a preservation of pasts as documents. 
However, it is clear that after a cinematic decade, we are assumed to 
have already received all the postcards, from the past as they are, 
already stamped into the office of memory. In this assumptious 
approach, cinematographic apparatus has perfect analogical 
resemblances with the memory of modern subjectivity. Having the 
same nature with the photographic image, cinematic images always 
signifies something that took place in the past and disappeared at the 
moment of viewing. No matter how short this temporal gap is, the 
retrospectivity cannot be overcome. As Andre Bazin and Roland 
Barthes pointed out, photographic and cinematographic images are 
substantial shadows of the past, which prove the existence of their
16
object of depiction at a certain past moment, which had 
disappeared.
The accumulation of photographic and cinematographic 
images throughout the whole twentieth century constructs a kind of 
social memory in this sense. One remembers, or has a possibility of 
recalling every single event that took place after “ the train entered 
the station” through the cinematographic memory. Our 
cinematographic memory keeps in reserve not only all the major 
events like world wars, Olympic games, establishment of nation states, 
but also recorded the everyday moments of metropolifan life; the 
factories, the crowds in the streets, fashion shows, entertainments, etc. 
The cinematographic apparatus also recorded the images of cultures, 
which does not possess such a memory, images of others, such as 
Flaherty’s and Rouch’s "uncivilized” tribes. One remembers, that had 
happened and existed once. Since we possessed our 
mechani/chem ical memory, we remember correctly and we will 
remember forever, this is the cruelty of memory according to Chris 
marker in Sans Soleil: "after all stories of man out of his memory, here is 
a story of a man who is out of forgetting...”
We are completely helpless when faced with such an 
understanding of memory; being exposed fo the images which 
certainly belong to the past, which prove their existence in some prior 
moment that cannot be inhabited once more. Cinematographic
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memory will signify such a loss forever. As long as we remember 
through the cinematographic apparatus we recall such a loss in the 
first instance. The lightened darkness is where structuralism and 
psychoanalysis relates to cinema, in this originary loss. However, for 
Bergson if there is memory, it is not the accumulation of optical or 
psychological time, rather it is an accumulation of past, present and 
future in their endless relation. Because, memory is not optical or 
psychological but temporal, as Bergson debates on. The 
scientific/mechanical/optical thought introduces the memory and 
time in the automatism of the production of images and the inverse is 
also true, meaning that memory can be and has been produced by 
the mechani/chemical process that cinema is. This theme has also 
been discussed by Walter Benjamin, in a way that, the ambiguity of 
reproduction techniques lies in is relation to automatic movement of 
the medium; automatic movement of the camera recording, 
automatic manner the projector reeling and therefore producing the 
automatic relation of the masses to this movement:
Mass reproduction is aided especially by the 
reproduction of masses. In big parades and monster 
rallies, in mass sporting events and the war, all of which 
today are conducted in front of the cameras and sound 
equipment, the mass looks itself in the face. This process, 
whose significance need not be stressed, is intimately 
connected with the development of techniques of 
reproduction and photography. Mass movements are
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usually discerned more clearly by a camera than by a 
gaze... this means that mass movements, including war, 
represent a torm of human behavior that particularly 
favors the apparatus, (stated in Cadava p.55)
It is this production of images, which produces the automatic 
manner and which substrates human productions, that enables a 
mass to see itself in the face. If we remember Leni Riefenstahl’s film 
The Triumph of the Will, we see how masses become visual blocks 
overwriting the screen. However, for Deleuze, this relation should be 
discussed, because in cinema the production of images, in these case 
memories, is not only automatic, on the contrary they introduce the 
movement and memory in its proper ontology after the Second World 
War. If for Bergson the question lies in its relation to time, it inverses 
completely all the discussions of technical positions for it is not the 
movement represented, rather it is the time for delaying, all detour, all 
waiting thus all indétermination. The technologies of time, in 
augmenting the possibility of memory and conserving time, improve 
our capability to act, always opening new possibilities. However, if the 
action brings about neutralizations, if it extends into habitual memory, 
or if it conserves the past in automatic mechanism, it should be 
questioned at once because for Bergson, memory cannot be 
interiorized as such. For Bergson all conscious signifies first of all 
memory. All consciousness is preservation and accumulation of pasf in 
present, retention of before in an after. This capacity of conserving
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time in time is also the capacity of creation and production of 
affective forces. Time, fhus in this discussion does not present us 
chronological determined dimension, as Bergson shows the time is 
where the creation continues in unforeseeable unpredictable 
reorderings.
Following this trajectory, in the third chapter, I will point out how 
these arguments effected cinema after two world wars, as Deleuze 
discusses how the orders of movement and time went through a 
transformation, after this period.
So I will start with another genealogy of faculties and 
configuration of forces, which provide the necessary grounds to 
construct an account of cinema without rigidizing its possibilities. 
Bergson elaborates the conceptual instruments, which enable us to 
understand the relation between the world and man through images. 
Bergson approaches the question of fhis relation in the limit situation. 
First of all, he gives a description of natural perception, neither as a 
psychological state anchored to a subject nor as discussed within the 
double articulation but as a relation between images: different flows, 
and different rhythms therefore different durations. This relation has 
also been functionally ensured in Bergson, by his approach to 
conscious, image, memory, concept, each operating as veritable 
interfaces, rather than creating analogical references between 
cinema and memory, cinema and perception... These interfaces are
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discussed as the same interface as cinema. It is the relation, which is 
based on the affective force, which means the capacity to a c t. 
Bergson gets away from the problematic of the visible in approaches 
to cinema, because the visible, too, has always been a function of the 
capacity to act. Thus it leaves us the space to ask the mere question, 
a question, which in its simplicity plunges into multiplicity and 
heterogeneity within the heart of cinema; What is cinema capab le 
of?
Following this line of thought, my aim in this thesis is to explore 
cinematic images in terms of time and movement. The generative 
logic behind these discussions will be the argument that art, in a 
broader realm, does not preserve mnemonic pasts but affects and 
percepts. Tracing the line of arguments which Deleuze sets forth in his 
two books, i.e. "Cinema 1: Movement-Image" and “Cinema 2; Time- 
Image” on Bergson, what I offer is one possible way of reading of this 
endless process.
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CHAPTER 1 :
THOUGHT IN MOTION
The writings of Gilles Deleuze, in his two books on cinema, 
C inemg-l: Movement-Image and Cinema-2: Time-Image, is a writing 
process that, by delivering itself up to cinema, breaks with the 
constitution of a restful place (of the critic and analyst). It refers back 
to a familiarity that is all the more displacing and strange in not 
allowing us to keep on it. Certainly, cinema, too, is not simply a 
mechanic way to creation, insofar as it touches creation as belonging 
to an outside always to come. The fascination of Deleuze with 
cinema, in this sense, does not lead to the preconceptions but 
becomings. Like thought, it is a movement of approaching, which 
does not end. In these sense, I will try to clarify the main points of 
convergence that Deleuze finds between philosophy and cinema in 
this chapter, which in turn questions both contemporary theories of 
cinema and history of philosophy.
1.1 Language and Cinema
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However, to approach and to keep on approaching, does not 
by the same token refer to a distancing, as does analytic thought. In 
the latter, one has to keep a certain distance from the thing under 
investigation, has to differentiate it from himself in order fo attain 
knowledge. That is why Deleuze problematizes the clichés and pre- 
established norms surrounding theories of cinema. Deleuze points this 
out, starting from the labeling of cinema with the norms of 
psychoanalysis and structural linguistics applied, which derives from 
their historical parallel evolution. Such methods of approaching 
cinema assume a disfance between the critic and the image right 
from the start. On the contrary, according to Deleuze, if an evolution 
there be, “Creative Evolution" is what we need, in terms of freeing 
cinema from what it is not. By bringing the concepts that Bergson and 
Peirce had put forward, Deleuze shows us a way to consider images in 
themselves, rather than enslaving them to double articulation.
Deleuze points out the relationship between cinema and 
language, tracing the Peircian semiotics throughout the first volume 
but concentrates more on it in the second chapter of second volume. 
For the mistake should not be repeated, Deleuze names this chapter 
as "Recapitulation of the Images and Signs". Not to capitulate but to 
recapitulate from capitulation. Not to continue the questions as they 
quickly establish their answers, but to ask new questions is the very 
Deleuzean method in this chapter.
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Deleuze’s choice of Peircean semiotics seems to be decisive 
here, because Peirce “ conceives ot signs on the basis of the images 
and their combinations, not as a function of determinants which are 
already linguistics". This does not mean that Deleuze denies the 
existence of linguistic features in cinema, rather he points out that 
cinema can not be analyzed only through syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic frameworks. Recognizing that something being 
presented in film cannot be articulated within the symbolic, Deleuze 
moves to a discussion of cinematographic image not as a linguistic 
determinant but as a philosophical concept. For him, cinema is a 
plastic mass: there is not an enunciation; images are not utterances. 
“ It is an utterable"( 1989b: 29). Instead ot dominating images and signs 
by utterances, which, in turn refer to a language system and carries 
out the discussion to syntagms and paradigms, he needs to define 
cinema as ‘not semiology but semiotics’, as the system of images and 
signs independent ot language in general: “Cinema is neither a 
language system nor a language" (1989b: 29).
In this sense, the question that is put by Christian Metz as “ In 
what conditions can cinema be considered as a language?", 
according to Deleuze, defines the problem in a wrong way: the 
historical tact that cinema has been considered as a narrative form, 
according to him, leads to an approximation which reduces 
sequence of images even a single image to a unit of language, that
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is, to the smallest narrative utterance. But this point where the 
cinematographic image has been reduced to utterance, means the 
capitulation of images and signs to language, is the main problem of 
the problem. According to Deleuze:
From that point on, this narrative utterance necessarily 
operates through resemblance or analogy, and, in as 
much as it proceeds through signs, these are ‘analogical 
signs’ . Semiology thus needs to have a double 
transformation; on the one hand the reduction of the 
image to an analogical sign belonging to an utterance; 
on the other hand, the codification of these signs in order 
to discover the linguistic underlying these utterances. 
(1989b; 27)
Cinema even with its verbal elements, cannot be understood 
in terms of utterance, because the utterance can be found in the 
image itself, but not as a given. Metz’s initial question in this sense 
assumes that all cinema is narrative, and if so cinematic narrative is 
linguistic. Although all the cinema theories, that Deleuze finds 
reductionist, define their realms as the mainstream narrative cinema, 
or a criticism of it, in turn, establish an improper circle where one is led 
to create synthetic oppositions. It is the first rule in Bergsonian method 
that we can evaluate our discussion: "Apply the test of true and false 
to problems themselves. Condemn false problems and reconcile trufh 
and creafion at the level of problems" (Deleuze, 1988: 17). We are not 
seeking for truth, but in order to understand the logic of this
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capitulation, one has to rethink and recapitulate the questions 
themselves.
I think, Deleuze first of all tries to underline that the way cinema 
has proceeded in narrative direction is not necessarily its own 
possibility, even when it is so, the narrative in the film does not 
necessarily require images to be utterances. Deleuze clarifies this by 
explaining the inherent structure of movement-image, which is more 
than an analogy, unlike the conception of utterance grounding 
analogy as a problem. Thinking in terms of analogy fails as soon as we 
think the grounding factor of the cinematic image as movement, 
because through movement we are no longer able to assign an 
analogy or resemblance of the image to the object. As Bergson shows 
in Matter and Memory, the construction of analogy is only possible if 
the movement is taken out from the moving body. Because, 
movement is the most visible characteristic of the image and when it is 
taken out, the image is left in a false appearance, a representation, 
an utterance. However in moving, the object is its imaqe par 
excellence, and there is nothing left to it to resemble.
The objects of reality have becom e units of the image, at 
the same time as the movement-image has become a 
reality, which speaks through its objects (Bergson, 1988;
28).
1.2 Image and Movement
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In order to approach this “ image=movennent" assertion we 
need an extended detour, enabling us to consider the role of the 
image in Bergson, where Deleuze grounds his discussion on cinema. 
Bergson approaches the question of the image, in the first sentences 
of the introduction of Matter and Memory. He postulates that in order 
to approach the questions of philosophy we have to start with a set of 
images and images alone, because in Bergson’s philosophy, 
everything is an image and the universe is an aggregate of images. 
Furthermore there is never one image which can be seperated from 
the rest. Even the natural perception is an image among others. All the 
tendencies that Western thought has with its instances of materialism 
or idealism is thus problematized through images. Since, for Bergson 
the duplicity of the image and the world cannot be overcome easily, 
as Deleuze articulates in Berasonism, Bergson needs to point out and 
even further to emphasize the abyss between these two philosophical 
misconceptions, which creates this duplicity. This is the main difficulty 
of starting with images:
These difficulties are due, for the most part, to the 
conception, now realistic, now idealistic, which 
philosophers have of matter. The aim of our first chapter is 
to show the realism and idealism both go too far, fhat if is 
a mistake to reduce matter to the perception that we 
have of if, a mistake also to make of it a thing able to 
produce in us perceptions, but in itself of anofher nafure 
fhan fhey. Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of
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‘‘images". And by “ image" we mean a certain existence 
which is more than that which the idealist calls a 
representation, but less than that which realist calls a thing 
-an existence placed halfway between the “ thing” and 
the “representation” . (Bergson 1988:9)
The confrontation of materialism and idealism, according to
Bergson, occurs in their relation to image. Debating to account for a
possible change in the comprehension of image i.e. matter, Bergson
turns to the philosophical effort to articulate a common ground where
combatants may meet. In this sense, Bergson initiates from the point
that, by definition, we can only grasp things in the form of images. If in
materialism, an image, related only to itself, possesses an absolute
value, in idealism it belongs to the world of consciousness where all the
images depend on the subject as the central image. Thus, in
materialism, we see the reconstitution of consciousness with pure
material movement of the universe, whereas in idealism the universe is
reconstituted in consciousness. This is the main obstacle for Bergson:
the duality of the image and movement, consciousness and the thing.
By stating, “all consciousness is something” , Bergson questions the
duplicity in the phenomenological statement that “all consciousness is
consciousness of something” . According to Deleuze, the latter
statement is the means of “anchoring” of the perceiving subject in the
world. The question involving cinema is the same regarding
consciousness and perception, even it forces this relation: “The
cinema can, with impunity, bring us close to things or take us away
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from them and revolve around them, it suppresses both the anchoring 
ot the subject and horizon ot the world” (1989a: 57). The cinematic 
movement, in this sense, enables a “drawing close to” the perceived 
and perceiver, the world and perception. Thus the relation of 
perception of the world, to the consciousness of the subject shows 
similarities to the always already perceiving and perceived cinematic 
apparatus as a consciousness itself. However, in not fixing conscious as 
a center of determination, it brings out new questions.
If we remember, Merleau-Ponty’s account of the visible, we 
see that vision is never empty, because it is intentional; it is an act 
towards an object. It is always the seeing-of-a-some-thing-that-is-seen. 
Thus consciousness is always consciousness of, indicating a separation 
between consciousness and the objects, just as seeing is also seeing 
of. Perception thus is anchored to a perceiving subject i.e. camera 
and human. Bergson in this sense makes a radical shift, by saying, 
“consciousness is something” , as he indicates the consciousness and 
the things belong to the same plane.
Such a parallelism between cinema and natural perception in 
regard to consciousness, as we have discussed, points out to the 
illusionary aspect of both. For Bergson, too, the cinema is an illusion, 
but it is so as the natural perception is. This, in Bergson, is due to that 
the model tor cinema is not natural perception but flowing-matter. By 
introducing this concept, which would constantly change and where
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a point of anchorage or a center of the subject is not even the 
concerns of the discussion, Bergson defines fhe problem in fhe 
aggregafe of images. Because if perception were problematized at 
the beginning of the discussion, it would be easily defined as fixed 
instanfaneous views, and according to Bergson this would be 
reducing both natural and cinematographic perception. It would 
stabilize the forces inherent to their structure. Thus according to 
Deleuze, Bergson’s argument here, ’’instead of going from the 
acentered state of fhings to centered perception, it would go back 
up towards the acentered state of fhings and get closer to it” 
(Deleuze, 1989a: 58).
However the question remains the same: how can we 
conceive matter as an aggregate of images? How can we link fhe 
consciousness and the thing? I think, Deleuze’s statement is an 
adequate answer concerning such problems: matter is moving:
We find ourselves in fact faced with the exposition of a
world where IMAGE=MOVEMENT. Lef us call the set of
what appears ‘Im age’ we cannot even say that one
image acts on another or reacts to another. There is no
moving body, which is distinct from executed movement.
There is nothing moved which is distinct from received
movemenf. Everything that is to say every image, is
indistinguishable from its actions and reactions, this is
universal variation... every image acts on others an reacts
to others, on ‘all their facets at once ’ and ‘by all their
elements’ all the truth is that the movements of mafter are
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very clear, regarded as images, and that there is no need 
to look in movement tor anything more than what we see 
in it. An atom is an image which extends to the point to 
which its actions and reactions extend. My body is an 
image, hence a set of actions and reactions. My eye, my 
brain are images, parts of my body. How could my brain 
contain images since it is an image among others? 
External images act on me, transmit movement to me, 
and I return movement. How could be images in my 
consciousness since I am myself an image, that is 
movement. And can I even, at this state, speak of ‘ego ’, 
of brain, of body? Only for simple convenience; for 
nothing yet can be defined in this way. It is rather a 
gaseous state. Me, my body, are rather a set of molecules 
and atoms which are constantly renewed. Can I even 
speak of atoms? They are not distinct from worlds, from 
interatomic influences. It is a state of matter too hot for 
anyone to be able to distinguish solid bodies in it. It is a 
world of universal variation, of universal undulation, 
universal rippling: there are neither axes, nor center, nor 
left, nor right, nor high, nor low...(Deleuze, 1989a: 58)
These infinite series of images constitute a kind of plane of
immanence. The image exists in itself on fhis plane. According fo
Bergson, this being in-itself of the image is matter. Matter, in contrast to
the phenomenological understanding of the term is not behind the
image, but it is the absolute identity of the image and movement.
Matter is movement-image and movement-image is the flowing-
matter. However if the movement-images there be in the plane of
immanence, they are not immobile and instantaneous sections, rather
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they are mobile and temporal. According to Deleuze, this temporal 
section is the bloc ot space-and time. “ Not mechanism but 
machinism” , adds Deleuze, because cinema is not a mechanic, 
closed system, consisting of immobile images coming next to each 
other, rather it is an infinite series of such blocs of space and time. The 
material universe or the universe as cinema in itself is the machinic 
assemblage of movement-images.
The nodal point of what movement problematizes in terms of 
our understanding of images, is a dispersing one. In this sense, when 
we say movement, we are already in the ground of action-reaction, 
consciousness, memory, perception, duration. What is perhaps most 
troubling, in fact, is that, Bergson’s attribution seems to work in reverse, 
these concepts cannot be understood as separate entities, as some 
terminologies we have been discussing throughout the history of 
philosophy. But also because once these concepts encounter one 
another neither remains the same, they experience rather a continual 
transformation.
In these sense, if for Bergson the thing and the perception of 
the thing are the same, they are related to each other in a way that, 
the thing is the image as in itself, and relates to other images, on the 
ground of action and reaction. The perception of the thing is related 
to another image that is my consciousness, but my consciousness is 
something, which acts and reacts, too. My perception is an image,
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but imaging perception as a photographic view of things in a 
representational way, as if it is the projection of something to the office 
of brain, is the most distant understanding of fhe ferm. The reason for 
such misconception is that for Bergson, neifher percepfion nor 
memory is simply menfal or duplicafes fhe physical. Referring fo 
maferialisf, idealisf and scienfific concepfions of fhe ferms, he 
esfablishes a common basis. Because all fhree regard percepfion and 
memory as being rafher a useless duplicafion of fhe realify or simply 
immobile reflection of a maferial consfruction, which dismisses the 
relation of percepfion fo acfion or memory fo conducf. Rather in 
Bergson, it is the radical questioning of percepfion; “buf is if not 
obvious that the photograph, if phofograph fhere be, is already faken, 
already developed in fhe very hearf of fhe fhings and af all the points 
of space?” (Bergson, 1988: 38). I fhink, fhis means fhaf the 
photographed exists as a photograph even before fhe work of any 
camera, i.e., consciousness, showing fhaf percepfion begins in 
phofography, however it is photography before photography as we 
know it. It is a convergence of thinking about photography; it suggests 
an irreducible link between consciousness and photography. If it 
indicates a metaphor, it is only in the sense that by means of infinife 
snapshofs, faken af the intervals of ifs flux, we will discover “ fhe 
cinemafographic insfincf of our fhoughf” (Bergson, 1944; 342). In 
Bergson’s wrifing, one can frace fhe metaphorical connotations
related to cinematographic and photographic medium. The reason
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for those to occupy a quite central position is that Bergson’s 
philosophy itself is guided by the principles of cinennatographic 
perception. It works like a camera attempting to capture and fix the 
relation between memory and experience. However, the relations, 
whom he aims at capturing, occur in a world composed solely of 
images. The mobility of images and their constant transformation 
make them impossible to be fixed in themselves. As Bergson says the 
complete image would vanish when motor activity tries to fix its 
outline. The accuracy of images of people, events, objects that the 
camera provides us with only increases the common belief that they 
are perfect analagons. Bergson’s criticism in this point is that 
photographs, being “ images of idle fancy or of dream ” can only show 
what is always already a photograph. It it pictures by immobilizing the 
image, which is essentially mobile, what is perceived in the 
photograph is not the image it shows but something, which has 
absented itself from the scene. The photographer and the camera in 
this scene, does not appear either, because “ it photograph there be, 
is already taken” . This is one of the main questions in the 
problematization of images, whether they are in the apparatus, i.e. 
mind, or not:
Every image is within certain images and without others; 
but of the aggregate of images we cannot say that they 
are within us or without us, since interiority and exteriority 
are only relations among images. To ask whether the
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world exists only in our thought, or outside of our thought, 
is to put the problem in terms that ore insoluble, even if we 
suppose them to be intelligible. (Bergson, 1988; 25)
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari clarify this 
insoluble equation in terms of transcendence. The illusion of 
transcendence for him is thinking in terms of inferiority and exteriority of 
images in relation to a subject. The relative horizon of the subject 
functions as a limit in this equation, thus the limit is something “which 
changes with an observer and encloses the observable states of 
affairs" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 36). Merleau-Ponty defines this 
limit with the intentionality of the subject:
Nothing prevents us from crossing the limits with the 
movements of the look, but this freedom remains secretly 
bound; we can displace our look, that is transfer its limits 
elsewhere. But it is necessary that there be always a limit; 
what is won from one side must be lost from the other 
(Merleau-Ponty: 100).
On the other hand, immanence does not belong to a subject, 
rather it is “ the horizon itself that is in movement: the relative horizon 
recedes when the subject advances, but on the plane of immanence 
we are always and already on the absolute horizon” (Deleuze, 1994; 
38). We are dwelling on this question of the limit for a simple 
convenience, because the relative horizon of the camera, defines 
what is in the frame and what is out-of-field. However for Deleuze, the
limit is not dependent on the natural perception nor camera although
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they always seek for it ‘we head for the horizon, on the plane of 
immanence, and we turn with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes 
of the mind... take Michaux’s plane of immanence for example, with 
its infinite, wild movements and speeds” (Deleuze, 1994; 41). This infinite 
and wild movements towards the horizon, as the movements of Don 
Quixote, for us means the instances of cinema i.e. films, each defining 
their own plane of immanence. Thus they don 't define a limit; on the 
contrary, they always intervene with the outside. The film does not 
construct an inside rather it is this infinite questioning of the limit, i.e. 
film. It is an infinite movement towards the horizon: the passion. This 
passion for making films can be seen when Fassbinder does not sleep 
for 3 days, may be because he does not want to come back soon, or 
when Godard preferring 15 minufes for shooting the film and the rest 
of the day for thinking on it. They head for the horizon but they do not 
define if. The eye, the camera, thus becomes thought in its relation to 
the limit. The relation to visual exhibited by contemporary theorizations 
of cinema thus interrupted, because it is mediated and reinforced by 
their relation to the realm of fhought. This passage of eye in becoming 
thought, also can be found in fhe indications found in the 
methodology of Bergson. It is not fundamentally psychology or 
phenomenology of the eye, nor it defines the photographs in the mind 
or memory, rather it is the power to act, power to film, being in the 
movement of the world. It is how we understand the cinematic body
as Bergson clearly questions in regard to our bodies:
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Here are external images, then my body, and, lastly the 
changes brought about by my body in the surrounding 
images. I see plainly how external images influence the 
image that I call my body: they transmit movement to it.
And I also see how this body influences external images: it 
gives back movement to them. My body is, then, in the 
aggregate of images, receiving and giving back 
movement, with, perhaps, this difference only that my 
body appears to choose, within certain limits, the manner 
in which it shall restore what it receives. (1988: 19)
1.3 Perception-Affection-Action-Image
Certain questions can be raised here: What does a body refer 
to? What is cinema? What is it capable of? According to Bergson, our 
body, i.e. cinema is first of all an instrument of action. That is, it is an 
agent of transferring a received movement to reaction, "my body an 
object destined to move other objects, is then, a center of action: it 
cannot give birth to a representation" (Bergson, 1988: 20). This is what 
Deleuze means by action-image.
In this sense, what happens asks Deleuze, in this acentered 
universe, in the plane of immanence where everything reacts on 
everything else? How can we talk about a body? In telling us of the 
absence of any determining point that would identify consciousness, 
of any marker that might serve to celebrate it, Deleuze reveals, what 
Bergson has already told us by stating that what happens is "at any 
point whatever of the plane an interval appears -a  gap between the
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action and the reaction” (Deleuze, 1989a: 61). For Bergson everything 
is movement only if it includes the interval between movements. 
However, this phenomenon of the interval is only possible if the plane 
of immanence includes time. Thus, living image is not a center of 
determinafion, rather, the living image is differentiated from the rest by 
virtue of the interval; reaction is not immediate but delayed. Because 
for the reaction, it is impossible to be a received excitation for living 
image.
By virtue of the interval, these are delayed reactions, 
which has the time to select their elements, to organize 
them or to integrate them into a new movement which is 
impossible to conclude by simply prolonging the received 
excitation. (Deleuze, 1989a: 62)
This is sufficient to define one fype of image among others: 
living images or matters. If we can consider ofher images acfing and 
reacfing by all their facets and all their parts, living images only 
receive actions on one facet or certain parts and execute reactions 
by other parts. Thus the living image will be "an instrument of analysis in 
regard to the movement received, and an instrument of selection in 
regard to the movement executed" (Deleuze, 1989a: 62). Because 
they only owe this privilege to the phenomenon of a gap, or an 
inferval befween a received and execufed m ovem ent living images 
will be “ cenfers of indeferminafion", which are formed in fhe 
acenfered universe of movemenf-images" (Deleuze, 1989a: 62).
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According to Deleuze, the second point where we con talk 
about the ditferentiation of the living images from the rest occurs in 
luminous aspect of the plane of matter. For Deleuze, the living image 
provides the black screen, which the plane lacked and which 
prevented the influencing image (photo) from being developed. 
Unlike other images, which diffuses and propagates the movement 
received directly to execution of it, this time, the light faces an 
obstacle, that is an opacity, which will reflect it. The image reflected, 
in its isolation from others is what Deleuze calls perception-image. 
Deleuze, in relating light to perception, I think, reconvenes to the 
cinematographic connotations that we come up to in Matter and 
Memory. In this book, Bergson suggests a definition of perception 
closely linked to issues concerning light and representation. Perception 
is a kind of framing, because certain actions that are undergone are 
themselves isolations that enables perceptions. However executed 
actions are not immediate to the action, which is undergone. The 
action is always unpredictable and brings forth new reactions.
According to Deleuze these two aspects of defining living 
images as "centers of indétermination" and “ black screen" is followed 
by the existence of a double system. The first system concerns all the 
images acting-reacting each other as a function of each ofher. But to 
this structure, another system where living images are singular and act 
as the aggregate of images, acts and reacts as framer:
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The thing and the perception of the thing is one and the 
same thing, one and the same image, but related to one 
or other of two systems of reference. The thing is the 
image in itself, as it is related to all the other images to 
whose action it completely submits and on which it reacts 
immediate. But the perception of the thing is the same 
image related to another special image which frames if, 
and which only retains a partial action from if, and only 
reacts to it immediately. (Deleuze, 1989a: 63)
If we define perception on the same ground with the thing, we 
can conclude that there is nothing more in the perception than what 
there is in the thing. On the contrary, there is less, according to 
Deleuze, because we have already defined perception as a framing. 
We frame according to our interests, thus we perceive the thing but 
we subtract which does not interest us. This is the first material 
movement of subjecfivify: if is subfractive. According to Deleuze, the 
thing then itself presenfed in ifself as a com plete immediate, diffuse 
percepfion.
The fhing is image and, in fhis respecf, is perceived ifself 
and perceives all the other things inasmuch as it is subject 
to their action and react to them on all its facets and in all 
their parts... in short things and perception of the things 
are prehensions, but things are total objective 
prehensions, and perception of things are incomplete and 
prejudiced, partial, subjective prehensions. (Deleuze, 
1989a: 64)
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Again, for Deleuze this discussion shows us why we cannot take 
natural subjective perception as a model for cinema. Rather, Deleuze 
defines perception-image, which shows us the double regime of 
perception. At once the camera is in things and it occupies the 
objective perception as Vertov might call it, and it is also distinguished 
from the rest by the simple elimination or subtraction of the framing. 
This is how Deleuze defines perception as unicentered subjective 
perception, because it is related to a center of indétermination.
However, we cannot conclude that the whole operation is 
subtraction. Because as soon as we define everything as movement- 
images and the living matter as a special image among others, the 
universe is incurved and organized to surround it. And it so, this is 
already from the point of view of the action, from which perception is 
inseparable. By incurving, perceived things becom e an excitation for 
the living matter by offering their unstable facet towards us and at the 
same time as our delayed reaction, which has becom e action, learns 
to use them.
Perceiving things here where they are, I grasp the “virtual 
action” that they have on me, and simultaneously the 
“possible action" that I have on them, in order to 
associate me with them or to avoid them, by diminishing 
or increasing the distance. It is thus the same 
phenomenon of the gap, which is expressed in terms of 
time in my action and in terms of space in my perception. 
The more the reaction ceases to be immediate and
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becomes truly possible action, the more the perception 
becomes distant and anticipatory and extracts the virtual 
action of things. (Deleuze, 1989a: 65)
Thus this is the second avatar of the movement-image, the 
second aspect of subjectivity. It is no longer an elimination in terms of 
framing, but the incurving of the universe “which simultaneously 
causes virtual action of things on us and our possible action on things" 
(Deleuze, 1989a: 64). But the interval cannot only be defined by 
clearing ouf fhe perceptive and active faces which belongs to the 
other side of fhe interval. Rather there is an in-between and affection 
is what occupies the interval "without filling it in or filling it up"(1989a, 
65).
It is there between a perception and a hesitant action. It is the 
coincidence of objecf and subject, which finds ifs explanation in the 
subject which perceives itself, or feels ifself from fhe inside. Because it 
does not revert to the other objects of perception or the act of 
subjecfs, rather they mark the coincidence of object and subject in its 
pure quality. This is what Deleuze calls affection-image.
This is absorption of fhe action and reaction rather than being 
a reflection of if. If becomes an effort, a tendency that replaces 
action, which has becom e momentarily immobile. Affection-image 
however shouldn’t be understood as a neutralization of percepfion 
and action-image, rather it establishes the relation from fhe beginning.
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That is why the face is the affection-image par excellence for Deleuze, 
because the face “with its relative immobility and its receptive organs, 
which brings to light this movements of expression while they remain 
frequently buried in the rest of fhe body" (1989a: 66). The face reveals 
expression (action), perception (sense organs), and the affection 
(interval). However, it does not actualize such virtual affects in a 
particular person. It provides them with a body, while effacing ifself 
from the scene as belonging to an individual. The strength of close-up 
shots, according to Deleuze, lies precisely in this: forcing the face to 
the point of inhumanify. The desubjecfivization of the face offered by 
the close-up points to the becomings, the constant displacement and 
dissolution of a fixed identity. Thus each of us is a complex system of 
these three sorts of images, perception-image, action-image and 
affection-image, a consolidation of it. The sensory-motor link is the 
automatic relationship of perception-image, action-image and 
affection-image.
More fundamentally, we find fhe original source of this relation, 
from the point of view of affect: it is the capacity to both affect and 
get affected. In effect, for affections Bergson should presuppose a 
force very profound which makes all of the images that Deleuze 
defines in terms of movement-images and time-image sensible, it puts 
them in relation: duration and succession, a multiplication of points 
and unforeseen instants, memory and forgetting. But only through the
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interval it opens up. Because the question is if one image starts when 
the other finishes, or if they buried in the interval itself therefore 
exploding every time one starts? What makes possible this relation of 
time to cinema?
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CHAPTER 2;
CEASURA
Boneyard of names, heads never empty.
Maurice Blanchot
CAESURA. -  history comes to a head in the moment of 
disaster, in the time ot the disaster that structures the 
danger of history. In the almost-no-time of the disaster, 
thinking comes to a standstill. It experiences itself as 
interruption. (Cadava; 59)
Deleuze’s efforts to analyze cinematographic images as a 
negotiation of time and movement cannot be thought without 
historical references. According to him there was a time, a history, 
about which we can no longer speak. The unspeakable but also 
unescapable time of the death camps is the unforgettable and 
unrecallable at the same time. The question, in this sense, Resnais 
confronts when he tries to make a film about death camps was not a 
question of a sfandard documentary where one captures the logic of 
fhe event, on the contrary, it was a challenge of capturing on film the 
enormity of the horror. As Deleuze states it is not a simple question of 
conveying the idea of horror: “when the violence is no longer of the
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image and its vibrations, but of the represented, we move to a blood- 
red arbitrariness” (1989b: 164). Thus for Deleuze, thinking about the 
death camps does not consist of prolonging the suffering in a 
complaint as if the event can be represented in images, rather 
through the logic of disaster, the obscurity of the disaster, one can 
carry the light to the images. In his film Night and Fog. Resnais tells us 
"and there are those of us who look concernedly at these ruins as if 
the old concentration monster were dead in the rubble, those of us 
who pretend to hope before this distant future, as if the plague of the 
camps had been wiped out, those of us who pretend to believe that 
all this happened long ago and in another country, those who never 
look around to see and hear....” If Deleuze defines concentrafion 
camps as a break in history of man, cinema confronts with this break 
and this break is the sole thing that makes someone to see and hear 
the impossibility of not seeing and hearing.
The logic of the disaster is everywhere. “Things just go on” , and 
have gone in this way ‘this is the catastrophe” says Benjamin. 
"Catastrophe is not what threatens to occur in any moment but what 
is given in any moment” (Benjamin, qtd. in Cadava; 59). The radical 
difference between Deleuze's affirmations of how cinema has been 
affected by the Second World War and the analogy constructed 
through a parallelism between cinema and historicism lies here. 
Deleuze’s point of view cannot be seen as a historicism and therefore
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be defined as drawing parallels to history of man. Because instead of 
historicism which presents an eternal image of the past, Deleuze’s 
claim can be seen as a setting into motion an experience with time 
original to every present. In this sense, if he marks the concentration 
camps as a turning point within the history, it is not for humanizing the 
incomprehensible horror, of making it comprehensible and therefore 
diminishing it, rather it is because being incomprehensible, it blasts 
shattering any idea of continuum. If Deleuze draws parallels between 
the blast in Hiroshima or the suffering in concentration camps, it is for a 
simple reason: the disaster takes care of everything:
To think would be to name (to call) the disaster the way 
one reserves, in the back of one's mind, an unspoken 
thought.
I do not know how I arrived at this, but it may be that in so 
doing I struck upon the thought which leads one to keep 
one ’s distance from thought, for it gives that: distance. 
(Blanchot, 1995: 4)
Thus the temporality of the cinematographic images, in 
Deleuze, relates with this unpassable distance within the movement of 
thought. If Blanchot problematizes a question of writing through the 
logic of disaster, it is not because he writes about the disaster rather he 
writes with disaster, he approaches disaster every time he starts writing 
and the disaster writes in him. He faces a time as unthought. It is not 
the time of the event represented, rather it is the impossibility of
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philosophizing that time within the memory of the event: "know what 
has happened and at the same time you will never be able to". 
(Smock, in Blanchot, 1995: VÜI) For Deleuze, too, cinema testifies such 
a relation to thought: “ the impossibility of thinking that is thought" 
(1989b: 166). In this sense, according to Deleuze, Blanchot tries to give 
a fundamental question about how we think:
What makes us to think is “ the impower of thought", the 
figure of nothingness, the inexistence of a whole which 
would be thought. What Blanchot diagnoses everywhere 
in literature is particularly clear in cinema; on the one 
hand the presence of an unthinkable in the thought, 
which would be both its source and barrier; on the other 
hand presence to infinity of another thinker in the thinker, 
who shatters every monologue of a thinking self. (1989b:
168)
That is why, in the second volume on cinema. The Time-lmaae 
Deleuze concentrates on the fissure within the heart of cinema. For 
Deleuze what is conveyed in the films before the Second World War 
was a construction of the whole as a film, and the whole as a subject. 
The whole in this sense was being continually made -in cinema, by 
internalizing the images and externalizing the whole through the 
images- thus the whole was open. If we consider the films of Eisenstein 
every image internalized in a film was chosen in a way that with the 
preceding one it be put in to contrast therefore showing the power of 
the contrast, which externalizes a thought as shock. A thought is the
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action-thought, which indicates a relation between man and the 
world within the boundaries of sensory-motor unity. Everytime it was 
being made within the motor action-reaction chain, even conveyed 
through the shock, the images was subsequent to each other in an 
intellectual automatism.
However, after the war, the virtually infinite relations that are 
condensed in a film cannot be called a whole, without everytime 
shattering with a blast. Because for Deleuze if any whole is constructed 
in cinema it is the whole as the outside:
When we say ‘the whole is the outside’ the point is quite 
different. In the first place, the question is no longer that of 
the association or attraction of images. What counts is on 
the contrary the interstice between images, between two 
images ‘ a spacing’ which means that each image is 
plucked from the void and falls back into it. (1989b: 179)
Here and Elsewhere. In G odard’s Here and Elsewhere the 
problemiztization of images coming next to each other is ultimate. 
Here a French family watches news from elsewhere where the 
Palestinian war goes on. Unlike, the Badrillardian assumption that the 
war has not happened because it has been represented through 
images, the war really happens in G odard’s film and there are real 
people watching it. The relation among images is important here, it is 
not a association -in this case association through televisual flow- 
rather the interstice between here and elsewhere. There is not a 
continuity between the French family and the group of fedayeen. 
Rafher the interaction of the two, traces a frontier which belongs 
neither one nor the other. An interrupted chain of images, like a
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silence which is not an act in order to continue talking but where 
words fall in, it is the radical calling into question of the images being 
slave to the next.
It is the method of BETWEEN, ‘between two images’, which 
does away with all cinema of the one. It is the method of 
AND, ‘this and then tha t’, which does away with all the 
cinema of Being=is. Between two actions, between two 
affections, between two perceptions, between two visual 
images, between the sound and visual: make the 
indiscernible, that is the frontier, visible. (1989b: 180)
The direct presentation of time thus occurs in the fissure, 
questioning every possibility of continuity. The chronological continuity 
of the conceptualization of time shatters, and becomes rather a 
stratography of what was once called a singular layer of reality. The 
power of the outside passes into the interstice.
The present is always already shattered with the logic of the 
disaster and the critical part of Deleuze’s distinction between 
movement-image and time-image lies in questioning the presentness 
of the cinematographic image. If we remember what we have 
discussed in the first chapter -explaining how Bergson questions action 
and perception defining that our actions are responses to how we 
perceive the world- the presence of a motor-unity that constructs the 
movement-images, is similar in the way we relate one image to 
another, assuming ever greater presents following each other. For 
Deleuze, the laws of action-perception account not only for the force
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of images upon each other in a time where things just go on, but it 
also coincides with unity of the moments i.e presents and the interval 
between them.
This is the manifestation of the movement-image, which make 
the interval the motor-part of the images Deleuze puts forward. 
Subsequently emphasizing that, instinctively cinema at the beginning 
of its trajectory, presented bodies that are influencing each other in a 
chain of action and reaction. It is a chain of all expected events: the 
telephone rings, a man picks up the receiver, then we see the man on 
the other hand of the line, the first man says he is coming, hangs up, 
walks out the door, down the stairs, gets into the car, drive through the 
parks, streets, parks his car in front of a building, goes in, climbs the 
stairs, rings the bell... And, of course, someone opens the door. 
However, this infinite action-reaction chain is not enough to conceive 
of movement of images, because the automatic manner in which 
they chase each other is only one part of what Bergson otters us by 
equation of image=movement. Because when we consider living 
images in relation to the rest of the bodies, we see that it is not simply 
in action-reaction establishes itself, rather it is the very interruption that 
time and thought brings forward. That is why, affection-image is in a 
certain sense is an opening way to time-image. Introducing an interval 
within the subject, affection makes possible tor Deleuze to conceive
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time. Interval along with the before and the after is what constitutes 
the fracture in the I.
The movement-image pretends to be in the present. It 
supposes an empirical course of time consisting of successive 
momenfs, where presenf could only be understood in relation to a 
before and after so that the past is only a former presenf and fufure a 
present to come. Time understood as such is a representation of 
movement. In time-image on the other hand time is no more 
empirical, it is out of joint, where it presents itself in the pure state. Time- 
image no longer derives from movement but as wild movement it 
reveals time. Time is out of joint. For Deleuze this is the main theme to 
explain what he means by the empty form of time;
The joint, cardo, is what ensures the subordination of time
to those properly cardinal points through which pass the
periodic movements which it measures (time, number of
the movement, for the soul as much as the world). By
contrast time out of joinf means demented time or time
outside the curve which gave it a god, liberated from ifs
overly simple circular figure, freed from the events which
made up its consent, its relation to movement overturned;
in short, time presenting itself as an empty and pure form.
Time ifself unfolds (fhat is apparently ceases to be a circle)
instead of things unfolding wifhin it (following the overly
simple circular figure). If ceases to be cardinal and
becomes ordinal, a pure order of time... We may define
the order of time as this purely formal distribution of fhe
unequal in the function of the caesura. (1968: 88-89)
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CHAPTER 3:
TO REMEMBER FORGETFULLY: TIME
The thought of the other, the other os thought.
Maurice Blanchot
3.1 Optical and Sound Stations
My reading from this point onwards would try to attend to the 
way in which Deleuze’s anticipation upon the nature ot time-image 
cinematographically affirm, in the very era after the Second World 
War, through the transformation of essential cinematic elements in 
cinematic movements, such as character constructions, objects and 
settings, indiscernibility between real and imaginary, and orderings ot 
time.
If the disjunction that characterizes the relation of time-image
and movement-image corresponds to the caesura, Deleuze’s move
toward the very particular movements, singular films, and directors
within the history of cinema in turn, disjoints any idea ot a whole.
Deleuze suggests conditions of approaching cinema with its specific
instances, without rendering them into methodologies. It is obvious
when Deleuze asserts that in the post-war cinema movements like
Neo-Realism and New-Wave reality becomes something that is not to
be represented but something “ that is aimed a t’’(l989b, I). Instead of
defining Neo-Realism as a post-war movement which criticizes, realizes
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or represents the after war reality, or New Wave as a new form of 
intervening with reality, he redefines the question in c inem a’s relation 
to thought. If movement-image went into an outbreak, it is because a 
new element that is to prevent perception being extended into action 
in order to put it in contact with thought has been born. Instead of the 
subordination of images to sensory-motor schemata, which orders the 
world in a reasonable way -automatism- gives way to pure optical- 
sound situations, which is always already an intervention with the 
caesura that is not the motor-part of the images. Instead of defining 
what Deleuze means by optical sound situations I will try to trace them 
back marking out the transformations that cinematographic images 
went through.
3.1.1 Characters
From now on, says Deleuze, the character becam e a viewer. 
The sensory-motor scheme that he discusses, in the first volume of his 
work. The Movement-Image, is now broken. The character, being out 
of the motor situation is no longer “a subject of action” , but he shifts, 
runs and hesitates in vain. The situation that he faces exceeds his 
mofor capacities to respond and act, only leaves him in position of 
seeing and hearing.
In this context, the main character of this new cinema is like a
child; just like a child never knowing what to do and how to react, is
continuously affected by a certain motor helplessness. But, just as a
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child, this allows him to be more capab le  of hearing and seeing. 
Nevertheless, what he sees and hears is a world in ruins that never 
allows him in.
In Rosselini’s film, Germany Year Zero, the child protagonist, in 
Deleuze’s words “dies from what he sees" (1989b: 2). The child 
hopelessly tries to find a place in this world, during the war; when he 
fails to bring money to home, he steals; in an attempt to help his father 
he kills him (to free him from pain of his sickness and the war). When he 
runs from home, he tries to join the street kids but is not accepted then 
he creates a game for himself, kicking the stones in the ruins. Finally he 
climbs to an abandoned building still trying to play, he looks to the 
cityscape, which is all in ruin, jumps to his death.
Schlondorff, I think, also puts this traumatic situation of the child 
character, into question. The child, in Tin Drum does not want to grow; 
he does not want to join the adult world and its rules because what 
adult world means, in this film, is taking part in the approaching war 
and rising fascism. Schlondorff’s child also, in this sense, being not able 
to find himself a future as becoming adult, traumatizes himself to 
remain as a child. While his polygamic family breaks apart, while Nazis 
get into power, he simply witnesses the events wit a naked eye, he 
simply tries to continue to play his tin drum, which is the means of his 
refusal. And whenever fhe adulf world intervenes between him and his 
tin drum he stands still, stiff and paralyzed, yells out his destructive cry.
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He stands still against the world of action, against the world of masses 
becoming a subject; he remains as an exception through his aberrant 
movement.
“ Hitler as filmmaker" says Deleuze, "shows us the relation 
between the cinematographic image and art of the masses" (1989b: 
264). Referring to Benjamin's article “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction” he describes how the art of mechanical 
movement was itself to coincide with the automization of masses: So, 
in this film we see how the “ movement-image and an art of the 
masses becom e subject was broken off, giving way to the masses 
subjected as psychological automaton, and to their leader as spiritual 
autom aton” (1989b: 264).
However, even if in these limit-situations we are shown the 
filmic characters’ (as a child) motor helplessness, we need to add that 
for a child there is never an equilibrium of stimulus and response, in 
daily life too. In 400 Blows, the child neither belongs to the school nor 
to his family, in the banality of daily life and its pre-established norms. 
Rather he prefers to roam around the city; he sees the city during the 
night to which he has never been allowed to.
3.1.2 Objects and Settings
Another aspect that Deleuze discusses in regard to post war 
cinema movements is that “ the objects and settings take on an
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autonomous, material reality which gives them an importance in 
themselves" (1989b: 4). It is in this sense, not only the viewer but the 
character, the children in the films I have mentioned above, invest the 
settings and the objects by their gaze, that they see and hear the 
things and the people, in order for action or passion to be born, 
releasing from a pre-existing life.
Between the reality of setting and that of action, it is no longer 
a sensory-motor link which is established, but an immediate affection 
which can be felt through liberated sense organs through dreamlike 
connections. In contrast to any-instant-whatever of the mechanical 
time, through time space becomes something else: “Any-space- 
whatever” becomes the pure optical sound situation, because the 
characters find themselves in emptied and dehumanized spaces, 
exploring its limits. Unlike the spaces of sensory-motor situations which 
only leave them a space for presupposed steps, they do not disclose 
the characters. But any-space-whatever, whether disconnected or 
emptied, becomes itself a pure optical-sound situation, like the 
solitude or the incommunicability of the characters.
Wenders’ hotel rooms where characters find themselves in 
incommunicable loneliness, generates stories. In The State of Things 
when the film in fhe film can no longer be shot, another film starts, by 
the convergence of the hotel rooms from being the setting of the film 
to the realm of affections that characters find themselves when they
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are not in the film. In the film News from Home, too, Chantol 
Ackerman, sending images to her mother from New York, converts 
New York, her home to any-space-whatever. The film, instead of 
locating a central city, becomes a dream of time. As in Bresson’s 
Pickpocket the protagonist’s say "I hate the idea of going home” , 
even home becomes any-space-whatever.
3.1.3 Indiscernibility
Deleuze inserts a general characteristic of optical and sound 
situations that can be found in the indiscernibility of the imaginary and 
real, physical or mental, objective or subjective. In terms of the object, 
he clears out this point. If traditional realist description presupposes the 
independence of its object therefore a discernibility of the imaginary 
and real, by referring to Robbe-Grillet’s understanding of description in 
nouveau-roman, Deleuze states that in the pure optical-sound 
situations we are no longer able to discern what is imaginary from the 
real.
Since it replaces its own object, on the one hand it erases 
or destroys its reality which passes into the imaginary, but 
on the other hand it powerfully brings out the reality which 
the imaginary or the mental create through speech and 
vision. (1898b: 7)
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In G odard ’s Two or Three Things I Know about Her, the cuts 
between a w om an’s face and a cup of coffee give us a description 
among others. By consistently zooming-in to the cup, coffee becomes 
a visual description, consisting of black and white surfaces, whereas 
the w om an’s face is also forced to becom e a description. 
Concentrating on the city images throughout the film, Godard also 
problematizes how one can present the images of the city, replies with 
a city m ade out of detergent boxes. Here, the object of the detergent 
boxes both erases the necessity of traditional realistic description, and 
creates a pure optical city, when the image starts to fade out, we can 
no longer discern a city made out of buildings and a city of detergent 
boxes. This is the pure optical situation, the optical drama of the city, 
where we can no longer differentiate the imaginary from the real. 
Nothing other than giving descriptions is G odard ’s way of always 
returning to zero.
This indiscernibility can also be seen between objective and 
subjective situations. Whereas previously the camera meant to 
establish the objective view and the characters, director to play the 
subjective role, in pure optical-sound situations the very objective 
situations can not be discerned from subjective ones. Deleuze points 
out this between Antonioni and Fellini. In Antonioni’s films, the most 
objective situations such as deserted places, stock markets, roads are 
not formed without becoming mental, and going into strange invisible
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subjectivity, where as in Fellini the subjective world of crowds becomes 
inseparable from an objective view. If we consider Antonioni’s 
L’Eclipse we see that the stock market of the capitalist state becomes 
any-space-whatever, taking a subjective role in the love affair. The 
cold stones can not be differentiated from he blank faces it conceals. 
If we consider Fellini’s Satvricon we see that the whole subjects of fhe 
mythological time, takes on an objective standpoint in love. G odard ’s 
critical objectivism in this sense was already completely subjective, 
because in place of the real object he put the visual description, “and 
made it go ‘inside’ the object and subject" (1989b; 12).
The indiscernibility of the physical and mental can be clearly 
seen in Alfred Hitchcock’s films. None of the murders he shows remain 
without starting a mental relation. In a sequence, which he never shot, 
he imagines Gary Grant and one of the factory workers as they walk a 
car assembly line:
They might for instance, be talking about one of the 
foremen. Behind them a car is being assembled, piece by 
piece. Finally, the car they’ve seen being put together 
from a simple nut and bolt is complete, with gas and oil, 
and all ready to drive off the line. The two men look at it 
and say; “ isn’t it wonderful!" then they open the door to 
the car and out drops a corpus. (Truffaut: 195)
Where has the body come from? If is obvious that it was not in 
the car since they’ve seen it start at zero. The corpse drops out of
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nowhere. Neither from a physical place it comes from nor a physical 
body that is. Rather it is the mental assembly of the images in 
Hitchcock.
In short, pure-optical and sound situations can have two 
poles -objective and subjective, real and imaginary, 
physical and mental. But they give rise to opsigns and 
sonsigns, which brings the poles into continual contact, 
and which, in one direction and the other, guarantee 
passages and conversions, tending towards a point of 
indiscernibility (and not of confusion). (Deleuze, 1989b; 9)
3.1.4 Still and Moving
In this sense, what enables us to see pure optical sound 
situations can be redefined in Japanese director, Ozu’s films. The 
cam era ’s objective movement has been broken in Ozu, the less and 
less camera movements reveals before us a pure situafion of what the 
character is and what he says, the action-image disappears in favor 
of the purely optical and sound situations. Unlike the empty spaces of 
the war as we have given as an example, what we see in Ozu is still life 
which is defined by fhe presence and composition of objecfs 
becoming their own container. Still life for Deleuze is a means fo 
understand time-image, because cinematographic still life is tofally 
differenf from pictorial or photographic ones. If if is fhe basis thaf 
cinematic image most directly confronts the photo, it also becomes 
most radically distinct from it. "The still life is time” mentions Deleuze,
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because the still life in cinema is the radical conversion of image in 
movement, in continuity. Ozu’s still life images are the duration that 
becomes perceptible.
In everyday banality, the action-image and even the 
movement-image tend to disappear in favor of pure 
optical-sound situations, but these reveal connections of a 
new type, which are no longer sensory-motor and which 
bring the em ancipated senses into direct relation with 
time and thought. This is the very special extension of the 
opsign: to make time and thought perceptible, to make 
them visible and of sound. (Deleuze, 1989b)
Because fhe cinematic images themselves are movement, 
unlike the other arts which are restricted to demand, cinema converts 
into potential what was once a possibility. What Deleuze affirms by 
problematizing fhe sfill-image in cinema, which does not simply stand 
still, is the point where cinema converts itself in a way fhaf in moving- 
still it presents time and thought as a potential. Cinematographic still- 
images do not simply differentiate cinema from photography but it 
shows us the relation between movement-image and time-image in 
cinema.
3.1.5 Power and Weakness
Whether limit-situations or everyday banality, the images have 
becom e something else, something that is too powerful, too unjust, or
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too beautiful. Deleuze, talking about the sequence from Godard's Les 
Carabiniers, where a militant girl is captured and waiting to be killed 
recites a slogan and where the soldiers cover her face with a 
handkerchief, states that it is too much because she is too beautiful to 
be killed. The image is too beautiful that you can no more stand to see 
it.
Of course, such tendencies are not remained without being 
attacked by Marxist critics, “ for being too passive or negative, in turn 
bourgeois and marginal, for having replaced modifying action with a 
‘confused’ vision” (Deleuze, 1989b; 19). But according to Deleuze, this 
is not the weakness of the characters rather it is the very weakness of 
mofor-linkages. In facf, this motor-break can be seen throughout 
Blanchot’s writing, where we see characters who do not reply when 
their names are called (i.e. in Thomas the Obscure), or they do not 
remember how a woman has entered their room, and for how long 
she has been there (i.e. in Death Sentence). So the weakness is a new 
kind of reaction, which finds its expression in waiting, or tiredness. For 
Blanchot the moment of fascination is the moment your sensory-motor 
links are broken.
The image in its weakness is the image that stays away from 
the clichés, for Deleuze, a cliché is a sensory-motor-image of the thing. 
Rather the pure optical and sound situations are readable and 
thinkable images.
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3.2 Habitude and Memory
Deleuze clears out the relationship ot sensory-motor schemata 
to how we perceive and recognize the world and how we respond to 
it. Because the primary function of perception is precisely to continue 
through a series of changes, thus extending our capabilities to act. This 
is what Bergson calls "élan vital” . Deleuze exposes recognition in the 
direction of what has not been sufficiently understood in terms of the 
principle articulation of memory, which traces a frontier with habitude. 
For Deleuze and Bergson, if memory affects our capability to act it is 
only possible when perception does not extend into recognition 
habitually. Since in recognizing the world, experience becomes a 
motor-part of the image, a habitude.
We can trace difference in the distinction of habitual and 
attentive recognition. Habitual recognition is the extension of 
perception into recognition is automatic. All recognitions happen on 
the same plane, from one object I know to other one I construct a 
single plane. However in attentive recognition, the extension of 
perception to recognition is not possible. There is no extension but 
always getting back to zero.
My movements revert to the object, return to the object, 
so as to emphasize certain contours and take a ‘few 
characteristics and feature’ from it. And we begin all over 
again when we want to identify different features and
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contours, but each time we have to start from the scratch. 
(1989b: 44)
Description again. Instead of adding up different objects into 
the same plane, the object remains the same but only passing 
through different planes. The relation between the description and 
reality is thus a provisional one, questioned, displaced every time one 
starts.
In the first case what we have perceived is the sensory- 
motor image of fhe thing. In the other case, we constitute 
a pure optical and sound image of fhe fhing, we make a 
descripfion. (Deleuze, 1989b: 44)
Buf whaf is the distinction to call a cinematographic image not 
as an utterance but a description? First of all, fhere is a disfincfion 
befween organic description and inorganic one. The organic 
description works like an utterance. It associates with the thing 
different things that resemble it in the same plane but in terms of an 
interest of the character in the film. “ If is grass in general fhaf inferests 
the herbivore" (Deleuze, 1989b: 45). The sensory-motor schema is 
again an agent of absfracfion, as in utferance the language 
becomes a motor-part of fhe image. Conversely in inorganic 
description the thing does remain the same, but through different 
images it becomes singular in each turn. “ Here is a gun". And here is 
another one. There is the pistol of a gun. The character to be 
described in very singular image does not know how to react to the
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situation, the thinness or the restraint of the image in showing single 
descriptions each time, points out an inexhaustibility. Endlessly referring 
to other descriptions, it creates images’ own works rather than 
separating an image and a thing.
The importance of description, thus, is the problematization of 
the link between perception-image extending into an action-image. 
The sensory-motor image is completely different from the pure optical 
image: because through descriptions the perception-image does not 
automatically extend to a movement, but enters in a relation with 
“ recollection”-image that it calls up.
3.2.1 .Recollection-image
A zone of recollections, dreams or thoughts correspond to 
a particular aspect of the thing: Each time it is a plane or 
a circuit, so that the thing passes through an infinite 
number of planes or circuits which correspond to its own 
‘layers’ or aspects (Deleuze, 1989b: 46).
This interminable process can be found in any evenf which 
problematizes two related terms, and yet run after each other. Two of 
the same: two perceptions, two moments, past and present. Deleuze, 
by joining the idea of description with recollection, points out to 
disintegration of memory. If fo recollect, is to inhibit time as a 
collectible, through repetitions it is not possible to refer to one as being 
first and important, rather it is the indiscernibility of the terms which
distances perception to fall into recollections.
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The notion of recollection image becomes visible and 
concrete in the case of ‘flash-back” . Flashback has always been used 
for referring to a past image throughout the history of cinema, but the 
cinema itself took the form of time-image, flashbacks have started to 
be use not as a form of "quotation of the past” but as a part of fhe 
flow of narrative (Deleuze, 1989b; 48). Deleuze mentions Mankiewicz in 
this sense; the flashbacks used as such, as an integral part of the 
narrative, in the same plane with the chronological flow of the 
narrative results in the fragmentation of its linearity, and therefore 
causality. Time forks rather than taking a chronological aspect. "It is 
not space but time which forks, web of time which approaches, forks 
... embracing every possibility” (Deleuze 1989b: 49). Therefore, what 
Mankiewicz problematizes is that ‘memory could never evoke and 
report the past if it had not already been constituted at the moment 
when the past was still present, hence in an aim to com e” (Deleuze 
1989b: 52).
But even attentive recognition has its dangers to fall back into 
sensory-motor schemata. Although the attentive recognition is a 
disruption of the moment between stimulus or response, when it 
succeeds, the sensory-motor flux takes up its temporarily interrupted 
course, because it ends up being a recollection-image which can be 
a motor image for automatic recognition.
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Because the problem for Deleuze is to know more precisely 
what is capab le  of playing the role of virtual image. Virtual is the force 
in itself, and when it is actualized it registers a lived .experience, where 
the force adhere to the bodies. And recollection image is the first 
circuit for him to understand virtual image, however insufficient: 
because the recollection-image is not virtual, but it actualizes a 
virtuality. As Bergson defines pure-recollection as the past in itself, past 
thinking itself, recollection-image is the actualization of it and the 
reverse is not possible. This is why the recollection-image does not 
deliver past to us but only represents the former present that past was. 
“The recollection-image is an image which is actualized or in process 
of being made actual, which does not form with the actual, present 
image a circuit of indiscernibility" (Deleuze 1989b: 54).
If recollection-images becom e a series of collection of the 
pasts that were present, it falls back to sensory-motor schemata, to 
autom atic recognition. However for Deleuze attentive recognition 
breaks with the sensory motor schemata when it does not work. It is 
the moment when we can no longer remember, all extensions remains 
suspended to open up into virtuality, as deja vu or pure past. "In short, 
it is not the recollection-image or attentive recognition which gives us 
the proper equivalent of the optical-sound image, it is rather the 
disturbances and the failures of recognition" (Deleuze, 1989b: 55).
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We start to open up to another circuit here, from failures of the 
recognition and recollection, amnesia, hallucination, the visions of 
dying, nightmare and dream becomes the main themes in cinema. In 
all of these patterns the memory-based recognition fails, and 
perception-image does not end up with an actualization of the virtual 
rather it involves a larger circuit where each image actualized 
becomes virtual in the second, and it continues like this. This is due to 
the fact that perception in dreams is never in present, and not 
present, it cannot refer to a past.
It is the dreamer who lives in the sleeper, dreams at the same 
time sleeping. Thus the dream-images are not grasped in themselves, 
but in a becoming which can be by right continue to infinity between 
imaginary and real. So in Buñuel, the razor cuts the eye, but in turn 
becomes clouds moving through the sun. The virtuality of the clouds 
makes the razor actual. Hence, the dream-image obeys a rule where 
indiscernibility of the imaginary to real is not guaranteed, like the 
recollection-image. In such an example, the imaginary belongs to the 
dreamer, and the awareness of the dream (the real) belongs to the 
viewer.
3.2.2 Dream-Image
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Circuits open up to others. For Deleuze, the musical films points 
out to an indiscernibility of imaginary and real, where dancers, 
through their depersonalized movement, outlines a dreamlike world. 
“The cinematographic act consists in this: that the dancer himself 
begins dancing as one starts to dream" (Deleuze, 1989b; 67), where 
the dreamer dances, only in accordence to the movement of the 
world. World-images shows, through movement, the body of a 
m an/wom an entirely cut off from his/her consciousness "possesses an 
infinite consciousness" (Deleuze, 1989b: 61). The action of the moving 
body is not an automatic one, creating and connecting any space 
whatever plunges into the movement of the world. “The road is not 
slippery without sliding on itself" (Deleuze, 1989b: 69). In Alice in the 
Cities, the house in the photograph that the child carries cannot be 
found unless the road itself becomes a series of phofographs. And 
when it is found, it is already of the road. This circuit as the largest one 
occurs in the virtual movement of the platform, road or the world. The 
cinema in this sense does not only present images but it surrounds 
them with a v/orld.
3.2.3 World-image
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3.3 Orders of time
3.3.1 Virtual Sheets of Past
Why circuits? All this discussion on recollection-image, dream- 
image and world-image, displays a complex relationship to Bergson's 
cone in matter and memory, where he explains virtual image.:
The point S is clearly the actual present; but it is not strictly 
speaking a point, since it already includes the past of this 
present, the virtual image which doubles the actual 
image. As for the AB, A ’B’ ... sections of the cone, they are 
not psychological circuits to which recollection-images 
correspond; they .are purely virtual circuits, each of which 
contains all our past as this is preserved in itself (pure 
recollection). Bergson is quite unequivocal in this respect. 
Psychological circuits of recollecfion images or dream- 
image are produced only when we ‘leap ’ from S fo one 
of these sections, to actualize some virtuality of it which 
must then move to a present S’. (Deleuze, 1989b: 294)
So the larger and larger circuits lead the actual sound and 
optical images to relate again virtualities, whereas for Deleuze the 
question remains the same. How can the cinematographic image be 
in the present and relate itself fo fhe virtual? Instead of leaping from 
points AB or A ’B’ to point S, we should take the smallest circuit where 
the object first of all differs from itself, if becomes its own virtual image: 
point S It is again a question about description that we come up with. 
Our initial theorem that the object remains the same and the
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perception runs through difterent circuits and planes now questioned. 
How is it possible for the object to remain the same? If we refer to 
Bergson with the idea of the virtual the thing first of all differs from itself 
first and immediately. Whereas in Hegel the thing first of all differs from 
what it is not, and this has the effect of making difference into 
contradiction. In ‘Bergsonism’ Deleuze maintains this idea very clearly:
It is difference fhaf is primary in the process of 
acfualization -fhe difference befween fhe virfual we 
begin and the actuals at which we arrive, and also the 
difference between the complimentary lines according to 
which actualization takes place. In short, the 
characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is 
actualized by being differentiated and is forced to 
differentiate itself, to create its lines of differentiation in 
order to be actualized. (1991:97)
Deleuze emphasizes that the optical and sound images are the 
names for the actual image which is cut off from the motor extension 
and then formed large circuits with recollection-image, dream-image 
and world-image. But for him the genetic element can be found when 
the actual optical image crystallizes with its own virtual image, on the 
smallest circuit, this is the crystal-image, which gives us the key of 
opsigns and their compositions. Where as recollection, dream and 
world-images are ‘nothing other than slivers of crystal-images'. It is like 
Foucault’s pirate ship; if they define an inside it is only through opening 
to virtuality of the outside. And there is a ship with its dark side in the
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sea, a ship from above, crystals. Thus, it is a mutual image where 
exchange continues. But what is virtual image in relation with the 
actual one, and how mutual can the relation be?
Deleuze seeks the answer in Bergson's reply; in time's abyss. This 
is the problem ot the continuity ot time as we naturally think ot it: the 
actual is always a present, but then the present passes when a new 
present replaces it. But this is meaningless, according to Bergson, 
because unless present being is also passing how can it becom e past 
and let other presents arrive? Thus the image has to be present and 
past, still present and already past, at once and at the same time'. 
Paramnesia again reveals this point perceptible, where in Oh Woe is 
Me, Godard structures the whole film on this: the recollection ot the 
present is the contemporary to present itself. It is like an actor, says 
Deleuze, listening to himself and beholding himself playing.
Bergsonism makes possible a whole pathology of duration.
In an outstanding article on “ paramnesia" (false 
recognition), Bergson invokes metaphysics to show how a 
memory is not constituted after present perception, but it 
is strictly contemporaneous with it, since at each instant 
duration divides itself into two simultaneous tendencies, 
one ot which goes forward the future and the other falls 
back into the past. He also invokes psychology, in order to 
then show how a failure of adaptation can make memory 
invest the present as such. Scientific hypothesis and 
metaphysical thesis are constantly combined in Bergson in 
the reconstitution ot complete experience. (1991; 118)
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The virtual image does not obey the role of chronological 
succession or the failure of it. It is pure recollection. Unlike recollection 
and dream-images which are actualized in relation to a new present, 
virtual image is not defined by a present which would relatively 
becom e past, but with the actual present in which the past is also 
em bedded. Thus, pure virtuality establishes an infinite circuit with the 
actual image rather than being actualized. The virtual image, than is 
in time and not in consciousness, because when we recall:
Just as we perceive things in the place they are and have 
to place ourselves among them in order to perceive 
them, we go to look for recollection in the place where it 
is, we have to place ourselves with a leap into the past in 
general, into these purely virtual images which have been 
constantly preserved through time. (Deleuze: 1989b: 80)
It is not the consciousness of fime rafher time is the only 
subjectivity: The virtual image is the past as it is preserved in itself. Thus, 
the actual optical and sound image goes into a small circuit with its 
virtual expanding to the virtualities in the deep circuit. At every 
moment time splits into two, the present running towards future and a 
past accum ulated and preserved. This dissymmetrical exchange is the 
mutual image.
The crystal reveals a direct time-image, and no longer an 
indirect image of fime deriving from movemenf. If does 
nof abstracf fime; it does better: it reverses its 
subordination in relation to movement... what the crystal
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reveals or makes visible is the hidden ground of time, that 
is, the differentiation into two flows, that of presents which 
pass and that of pasts which are preserved. (Deleuze; 
1989b; 98)
The past, we need to say again, should be differentiated from 
fhe recollection-images which actualize it in us, rather it is preserved in 
time: we penetrate into virtual element to look for pure recollecfions. 
The pasf in fhis sense appears as being already fhere, independenf of 
our recollecfions. The presenf then is the coexistence of sheefs of pasf 
which confains everyfhing at the same time.
3.3.2 Peaks of Present
Buf as we separate pure past from recollection-images we 
need to separate the present from ifs acfual quality. The actual 
present stops being present and is replaced by something else. Past, 
present, future in succession, replacing each other. We are passing 
through events, which are filling presents that are in succession. The 
event is in preparation, arrives and it is over. However, for Deleuze, fhe 
event is not to be confused with the place or actual present it takes 
place, rather it is ‘the time of the event comes to end before the 
event does, so the event will start again at another time... the whole 
event is as it were in the time where nothing happens’ . Whereas 
chronos is the time of measures that situates things, persons and 
develops a form, covers events there is an abyss in time;
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Aeon: the indefinite time of the event, the floating line 
that only knows speeds and continually divides that which 
transpires into an already-there that is at the same time 
not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a 
something that is both going to happen and has just 
happened. (Deleuze, 1987b: 262)
And it is in empty time that we anticipate recollection, break 
up what is actual and locate the recollection once it is formed. On this 
occasion there is no future, present, past in succession, in accordance 
with the explicit passage of presents which we make out: there is 
rather a present of the future a present of the present and a present of 
the past, which Deleuze calls as peaks of present.
3.4 Crystalline Regime: Indiscernibility Again
Indiscernibility, undecidable alternatives between circles of 
past and inextricable differences between peaks of present is what 
constitutes the chrystalization of time. This discussion, problematizes the 
images as being neither naturally in the present nor simply referring to 
past.
The crystalline regime, according to Deleuze, can be
considered in four points in contrast to organic regime of the image,
firstly concerning that of the description that we discussed above.
Organic regime, which separates the image and object in a way that
the camera gives a description independent of the description it
creates, looks to a pre-existing reality. In crystalline regime by contrast
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stands for its object, both creating and erasing it, thus creating its own 
object and refer to purely optical sound situations, which is detached 
from their motor extensions. The second point is the difference 
between the real and the imaginary, is as we have discussed through 
time, and concerns the relation between them. In organic description 
the real is assumed to be recognizable by its continuity, thus with 
successions simultaneities and permanencies. It creates logical and 
motor connections that even we see recollections, dream or the 
imaginary we see them only in contrast. However in crystalline 
description the imaginary is no more discernible from the real, the real 
being cut off from its motor linkages, and the virtual being cut off from 
its actualizations, start to be valid for itself.
The two modes of existence are now combined in a 
circuit where the imaginary and the real, the actual and 
the virtual, chase after each other, exchange their roles 
and becom e indiscernible. It is there that we may speak 
the most precisely of crystal image: the coalescence of 
actual image and its virtual image, the indiscernibility of 
the two distinct images. (Deleuze, 1989b: 127)
The third point concerns narration and not the description.
Organic narration is a consequence of sensory-motor schemata
where characters disclose a situation, answering all questions in a
truthful manner, according to the goals, obstacles, means and detours
of the narration. This is the economy of narration according to
Deleuze, appears in action-image, and Euclidean space which
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requires and abstract notion of movement. In the crystalline 
description, on the other hand, since the motor schemata has broken 
and given way to pure optical and sound situations, the image is no 
longer a consequence of action but it presents itself as a condition. 
The space is disconnected, purely optical, sound or tactile. The 
movement rather tends to zero in a fixed shot or is exaggerated, 
incessant.
Now what characterizes these spaces in their nature 
cannot be explained in a simply spatial way. They imply 
non-localizable relations. These are direct presentations of 
time. We no longer have an indirect image of time, which 
derives from movement, but a direct time-image from 
which movement derives. We no longer have a 
chronological time which can be overturns by movements 
which are contingently abnormal; we have a non- 
chronological time which produces movement 
necessarily ‘abnormal, essentially ‘false’ ... if time appears 
directly. It is in de-actualized peaks of present and virtual 
sheets of past. (Deleuze, 1989b; 129-130)
The fourth point, that Deleuze discusses, is directly derived from 
this third point. Because time puts truth in question, not in terms of 
different epochs have their own truths but time is the force, which 
enables us, discusses truth’s truth. Giving the famous paradox of 
contingent futures that Leibniz discusses, Deleuze clarifies how the 
conception of time might change our relation to conception of truth.
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If it is true that a naval battle may take place how are we 
to avoid one ot the true consequences: either the 
impossible proceed from the possible (since, it the battle 
takes place, that is no longer possible it may not take 
place) or the past is not necessarily true (since the battle 
could not have taken place)...the naval battle may or 
may not take place, but that is not in the same world, and 
this two worlds are possible but are not 'compossable' with 
each other. (1989b: 130)
Thus Deleuze refers to Borges directly, as we always see in 
Borgesian stories all these incompossible worlds, which is derived from 
the labyrinth of time. You can meet with your father who is younger 
than you in a world, you can sit on a bank with your older self in an 
other world. However, Deleuze states through the falsifying narration, 
where time forks, passing through incompossable presents, returning to 
not necessarily true pasts these worlds can be compossable. In this 
narrations the force of time and the power of the false work together, 
description becomes its own object (stops presupposing a reality) and 
narration becomes temporal and falsifying at the same time. Like the 
reality aimed at in Neo-realism, the truth no longer revealed, achieved 
but created, which points not to the cinema of truth but to the truth of 
cinema.
3.5 Powers of the False
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In these conditions, the relationship between object-subject, 
that of the seen and the seer becomes variations through eternity, 
from the point of view of the veracity of the every possible story.
The story no longer refers to as ideal of true which 
constitutes its veracity, but becomes a "pseudo-story", a 
poem, a story which simulates or rather a simulation of 
the story. Objective and the subjective images lose their 
distinction, but also their identification, in favor of a new 
circuit where they are wholly replaced, or contaminate 
each other, or are decomposed and recomposed.
(Deleuze, 1989b: 149)
Deleuze creates a displacement of terms of reality and fiction, 
because for him the ideal of the true is the most profound fiction. 
When the ideal of trufh applied to real itself, fhings starts to change, 
the story-telling function starts to destroy every model of truth so as to 
becom e creator and producer of trufh, as when "he himself becomes 
another, when he becomes to tell stories without ever being fictional" 
(Deleuze, 1989b: 150).
In Godard's France Tour Detour Deux Enfants, the narrator 
states every time another story begins "him before the story after, or 
him after and the story before". This method according to Deleuze can 
be seen throughout Godard's films, the method of knowing what they 
(the camera, the characters, film-maker etc) were before being 
placed in the film, and after, at the point where the story telling 
function is set into motion.
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In this sense, I see Resnais’ work as an attem pt to construct a 
purely mental-space and time, perhaps or of memory those of any 
affective life wifhout worrying too much about the traditional relations 
of cause and effect, or about a chronological time sequence in the 
narrative. However in Resnais even if the story becomes less reassuring, 
than a linear narrative with logical developments, we are introduced 
with another story through the powers of the false. The story skips 
certain passages, preserves an exact record of unimportant details, it 
repeats and doubles back on itself. And this mental time with its 
peculiarities, its gaps, its obscure areas is the line that interests us since 
it is the temporality of emotions preserved. It is reached among a 
perfect labyrinth of time, introducing false tracks, variants, failures and 
repetitions.
A stranger wanders from one salon to another alternately full of 
elegant guests or empty, bumps into mirrors, follows endless corridors. 
His ears convey snatches of phrases, his eyes shift from one nameless 
face to another. But he insistently returns to the face of a young 
woman. And he offers her the impossible, what seems most impossible 
in this labyrinthine where time is apparently abolished, and becom e 
direct. He offers her a past, a tuture and a freedom. He tells her that 
he and she have already met the year before, that they had fallen in 
love, that he has now come to a rendezvous she herself had arranged 
and fhat he is going to take her away with him from the real that her
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husband presents. But the story the stranger is telling assumes ever- 
greater reality becomes more and more coherent, increasingly 
present and irresistibly true. Present and past are finally intermingled, 
while the growing tension between the three protagonists creates 
fantasies of tragedy.
Stranger; I first saw you in the gardens at Fredericksbad.
Woman: I don't think it was me. You must be mistaken.
Man: Actually, it wasn't so extraordinary after all. He had
started the whole thing himself, so he knew all the
possibilities in advance.
Laughter.
Others: Oh well then... if that's it... That explains everything!..
Still, it's funny that... etc.
The other guests too are nothing more than the guests in a 
huge hotel cut off from the outside world as if they are in a prison. 
What do they do when they are elsewhere? Nothing! Elsewhere they 
do not exist. As for past the hero introduces by force into this sealed, 
empty world, we sense that he is making it up as long as it goes. There 
is no last year and Marienbad is no longer to be found in any map. This 
past, too, has no truth beyond the moment it is evoked with sufficient 
force; and when if finally triumphs, it has merely becom e the present, 
as if it has never ceased to be so. The power of the false becomes the 
force generating the story. If Hiroshima Mon Amour was a false 
documentary, then Marienbad is a true fiction. In other words, it is 
about storytelling. This startling material, truth of cinema, is apparenfly
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what attracted Robbe-Grillet to the medium in the first place. As a 
practitioner of the ‘nouveau roman' in the fifties he had been involved 
in an aesthetic struggle to clear away the reign of opinion from the 
landscape of the novel, to give it validity in itself. Then the truth of 
memory or fiction would be equal to the truth of experience, which in 
turn would be equal to the truth of invention and creation. This is what 
would happen to time in the novel Robbe-Grillet conceived:
From the novel to cinema, Robbe-Grillet’s work testifies to 
the power of the false as principle of the production of 
images. This is not a simple principle of reflection or 
becoming aware... it is a source of inspiration. The images 
must be produced in a way that the past is not necessarily 
true, or that the impossible comes from the possible...we 
see that the power of the false is also fhe mosf general 
principle that determines all the relationships, in the direct 
time-image. In one world two characters know each 
other, in another world they don ’t know each other, in 
another... contrary to what Leibniz believed, all these 
worlds belong to the same universe and constitute the 
modifications of fhe same story. Narration is no longer a 
truthful narration which is linked to real (sensory-motor) 
descriptions. Description becomes its own object and 
narration becomes temporal and falsifying at exactly the 
same time. (Deleuze: 1989b: 131-132)
The whole cinema becomes a free indirect discourse 
operating in reality, and this differs from what we discussed before, in 
terms of order of time, that is, the coexistence of relations or the
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simultaneity of the elements internal to time. According to Deleuze, 
through the discussion begin with truth we come to the 
problematization of time, which brings the before and after in a 
becoming, instead of separafing them: its paradox is to introduce an 
enduring interval in the moment itself, in fhe series of time.
In talking they becom e something else, says Deleuze, for the 
great directors, they becom e philosophers or theoreticians, whereas 
Godard talks about Ingmar Bergman as if Deleuze is talking about 
Godard:
At the precise instant. Bergman, in effect, is the filmmaker 
of the instant. Each of his films is born of the hero’s 
reflection on the present moment, and deepens that 
reflection by a sort of dislocation of time -rather in the 
manner of Proust- to becom e a vast, limitless mediation 
upon the instantaneous. An Ingmar Bergman film is, if you 
like, one twenty-fourth of a second metamorphosed and 
expanded over an hour and a half. It is the world 
between two blinks of eyelids, the sadness between two 
heart-beats, the gaiety between two handclaps. 
(Godard: 77)
We return to zero again.
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CONCLUSION
The young man will smile on the canvas for as long as the 
canvas lasts. Blood throbs under the skin of this w om an’s 
face, the wind shakes a branch, a group of man prepare 
to live. In a novel or a film, the young man will stop smiling, 
but he will start to smile again when we turn to this page 
and moment. (Deleuze, 1994:163)
What is preserved in art, has becom e independent of ifs 
model, its creator and also of whoever is involved in its experience, 
from the very start, if it starts it is from fhe zero. It is always already 
detached from these determinants to preserve itself in itself. If cinema 
preserves blocs of times and space, it is not because it shows time and 
space but it distills sensations from them. Tati’s Mon Oncle, with its 
terribly impractical modern house dismantling with any interference of 
the users will stand up as long as the film stands. “Standing up alone 
does not mean having a top and bottom or being upright (for even 
houses are drunk and askew); it is only the act by which the 
compound of created sensations are preserved in itself" (Deleuze, 
1994: 164). Time is not recovered, it is obliterated in Marienbad. What it 
preserves, thus, what it, itself is a “ bloc of sensations, that is to say, a 
compound of percepts and affects" (Deleuze, 1994: 164). Here, the 
distinction between percepts and perceptions, affects and affections, 
is of prime importance. While the latter terms are subject oriented, the
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former ones exist in themselves os passages. If affection refers to a 
state of the body affected and therefore implies an affecting body, 
affect is the passage from one state to another. Of course taking into 
acoount the variation in the affecting bodies. Affect being " purely 
transitive, and not indicative and representative” involves the 
difference between two states therefore pointing out the duration that 
extend between two affections. (Deleuze, 1988: 49).
Artistic creation does not consist of the act of reflecting upon 
something, recalling instances from memory, but it is produced in the 
event of dissolving in the thing, that is an event of becoming. It only 
stands up by itself when human perceptions and affections are 
brought to make a compound of impersonal, non-human percepts 
and affects. Such anonimity related to percepts or affects, should not 
be understood as a transcendental value attributed to them. The 
desubjectivity, here, implies a singularity that lies beneath all that is 
apparent. Furthermore, art does not actualize these affects, but keep 
them appearing.
In cinema, one does not have signs ready for disposal. To put it 
in other words, films are not compounds of signs with static referents. 
The mistake of interpretative approaches to cinema stems from this 
basic misapprehension that images consist of signs waiting to be 
dechiphered, and thus to reveal their truth. ... when the encounter 
with the signs takes place, it forces one to think, not to think what had
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been, but what is not yet thought, not interpretation but creation, not 
appearance but appearing:
The work of art is born from signs as much as it generates 
them; the creator is like the jealous man, interpreter of the 
god, who scrutinizes the signs in which the truth betrays 
itself. (Deleuze, 1972: 163)
It is in this sense that signs do not refer to a fixed identity; it is 
rather the embodiment of differences and forces. Thus, inferpretafion, 
faken as the direct meaning of the word, fails to grasp the multiplicities 
inherent in the sign. However, multiplicities, again, are not initial givens 
to be discovered but to be produced along the process. One cannot 
assign objects to signs as their referent; what they refer is other signs. 
The sign is an image which stands for another image (its object). 
According to Deleuze, they can either be affections, that is “state of 
bodies” or affects, that is “variations of power." And the order that 
connects one sign to another is purely based on chance encounters. 
Thus “Signs are effects of light in a space filled with things colliding with 
each other at random” (Deleuze, 1997: 141). And when signs coincide 
time, when they directly open to iat, they can be perceptible by 
senses.
A work of art, whether it is a piece of music, a painting, a
novel, film, etc. lasts as long as its material is capable of lasfing. This
should nof be understood as a mere materialism. What is suggested
here is that the work itself is written, filmed, painted sensations. The
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material does not only exist to give physicality to sensations: the smile is 
not on the canvas, it is the canvas, the oil smiling. In other words, 
whatever is brought forward in the work of art is not the reflection of 
some ideas, or a representation of the prior existence of some objects, 
things, people, etc. It is not imagination as well, it is imaginary. The 
material never eliminates itself from the scene; it does not end giving 
way to sensations. It is the body of fhe work that the sensations refer fo. 
If is not an "obstacle” , as Deleuze says, “ that separates thought from 
itself, that which it has to overcome to reach thinking” (Deleuze, 
1989b; 189). It is not devaluation of fhe body, rather the unknown of 
the body is as important as the unthought of fhought. At the same 
time sensations and bodies differ from each other and cannot be 
reduced to one another. The material preserves sensations and 
extracts percepts from a perceiving subject, affects from affecfions 
belonging to certain states of things. Again for Deleuze, no matter 
how short the material lasts, “ it will give sensation the power to exist 
and be preserved in itself in the eternity that coexists with this short 
duration” (Deleuze, 1994: 166). The material changes, differs, mixes 
with other materials, even, at times, vanishes, and what is left is the 
bloc of sensations, optical and sound-situations, percepts and affects 
that carry along with them not only the present but also the pure past, 
which is independent of the subject that had experienced it.
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Memory fails to grasp this pure past directly, because it always 
relates the past to the order of sequential presents. It tries to 
apprehend past relative to different presents. According to Deleuze, 
this kind of thinking misses the “ past’s being as past", because it 
constitutes the past only if a new present arrives to replace this one. 
Absolute past does not stand for some priory present moment in 
relation to the actual present. It preserves itself in itself, as Deleuze 
points out, as past and present at the same time. An important 
question that can be raised here is that how this absolute past 
becomes available to us without its being actualized as such. The 
argument Deleuze makes on this point is that, it is the role of the 
involuntary memory in Proust, whose aim is not to reveal the truth of a 
certain moment in the past, but to bring two moments together, that 
share a common quality in the duration that extends between them. 
Past, not relative to the moment it had been present, nor to the lived 
present, but as immanence.
The essential thing in involuntary memory is not 
resemblance, nor even identity, which are merely 
conditions, but the internalized difference, which 
becomes immanent. (Deleuze, 1972)
It is the unpredictable encounter of two moments, that do not 
necessarily resemble each other in terms of analogy, but reminds us of 
resemblance, nor have a common identity, producing a sensation. 
What distinguishes this from the principles of voluntary memory is that,
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the latter involves a retrospective look to the past from the present 
moment. However, in Proustian involuntary memory, past is not an 
archive of collected moments to be regained. It emerges as a non- 
analogical relation between two moments, a relation which is one of 
difference, a quality that cannot be identified or belong to either of 
them. Thus, what is revealed, is not the truth of a particular past 
moment, but what is unexperiencable about it, its essence. The 
absolute past is saved in the coexistence of two moments, in the 
sensation or the image that emerges when they meet, then again, out 
of the reach of both.
Time, in order to become visible, seeks bodies and 
everywhere encounters them, seizes them to cast its 
magic lantern upon them. (Proust qtd. Deleuze, 1972:18)
In cinema, one is confronted with the past not in the form of an 
image that shows the past in its actuality, but with blocs of space and 
time that provides a possibility for an encounter with the absolute past 
in its virtuality. The presentness of the image, therefore always circles 
with this absolute past. The image is neither present nor past. In 
passing, it is an encounter. Each encounter, like the movement of the 
horizon, redefines and redefined in indissernibility of virtual and actual. 
In passing from one to another moment, i.e image, it is duration. 
Duration is what happens in-between, it can not be reduced to one or 
the other, therefore if can nor be reduced to anything. It can 't be
thought, but only sensed.
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Becoming-other is a process that cannot be reduced to the 
act of imitating the way something behaves. It is not identifying 
oneself with the other. In Deleuze’s words, “ becoming is an extreme 
contiguity within a coupling of two sensations without resemblance, or 
on the contrary, in the distance of a light that captures both of them in 
a single relation.” (1994; 173). Becoming-other is not a passage from 
one state to another. It can only be understood through sensations. It 
speaks of a zone of undecidabilify, where all identity dissolves. Proust 
becomes not the writer of fhe all memories, rather he writes anti­
memory within time. Anti-memory, is not preserving the pasts, through 
infinite repetitions it caries along differentiation. Difference is what 
happens between two repetitions.
The world of represenfation, on fhe other hand, can be 
characterized by its inabilty to conceive of difference itself, therefore 
repefifion itself. The "I think” of Cogifo replaces becoming, difference 
becomes an object of reprsentetion. Difference undersfood as such, 
could only be conceived in relafion to the identical, similar, analagous 
or opposed. Repetition in the same statement can only be grasped by 
recognition, reproduction, resemblance and remembrance. I 
conceive, I judge, I imagine, I remember, I perceive are the 
companinions of “ I think therefore I am ” .
The internalization of thought within the branches of Cogito as 
such, which also identify a dialectical outside, can no more define the
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confrontation of an inside and outside independent of distance. If 
theory of cinema does not bear on cinema, but on the concepts, 
images, events of cinema which are themselves related to other 
concepts, images having no privilege among others, like one object 
relates to another it is the practice among images which calls for an 
outside of thought. If cinema is a practice of producing images and 
concepts, philosophy too is a practice of creating. Philosophy, in this 
sense, is no more abstract than cinema. When we say philosophy and 
cinema it is no more cinema philosophized but an interference which 
enables new images, concepts and events.
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